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NOTES
NOT FIT FOR SEA DUTY: THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT,
THE UNITED STATES NAVY, AND FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AT SEA
The United States is about to face an unprecedented law en-
forcement challenge at sea. Already bedeviled by enormous
problems in maritime resource protection, international narcotics
smuggling and illegal waterborne immigration, the nation will soon
enter an era of near-exponential growth in its need for a federal
police presence afloat. This change in circumstances will result
from inexorable advances in technology and from shifts in demo-
graphic reality.
One can trace most of the United States' maritime challenge to
an international milieu in which the needs of an exploding world
population cannot be offset by available resources.' As a conse-
quence, accelerating competition for the sea's resources is inevita-
ble.2 At the same time, current ecological abuse of an increasingly
overcrowded planet will necessitate more stringent environmental
protection measures.3 Enforcement of those measures at sea will be
1. The United States Census Bureau projects that the world's population will grow by
more than 35% by 2010. Most of that growth will take place in lesser developed regions at a
rate five times that of the more developed world. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, 108 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 794 (1988).
2. Studies claim that increases in the productivity of the world's arable land will not off-
set the overall growth in global population. See, e.g., 1 THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 3-4 (1980); Toufexis, Too Many Mouths, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 48-50. The world
will likely turn to a much greater reliance on high seas fisheries, for example, as an essential
source of its food. This increased fishing activity will necessitate a greater degree of govern-
mental regulation, law enforcement and resource conservation efforts to ensure prudent and
peaceful resource exploitation.
3. See 1 THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1980); Sanction, What On Earth
Are We Doing?, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 24.
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essential to preserve and protect the world's oceans.4 Regionally,
greater economic and political difficulties, together with
mushrooming populations in many neighboring nations, will pro-
duce a substantial increase in the number of immigrants attempt-
ing to enter the United States illegally by sea. 5
America's population will continue its shift to a life more situ-
ated toward the coastal environment.' A coincident and increas-
ingly wide gap between the nation's "haves" and "have-nots" will
ensure that domestic criminal activity plagues this coastal popula-
tion.7 In the offshore and oceanic regions of the world, American
citizens will engage in more distant and extensive commercial, so-
cial and recreational activity on, under and over the seas. Not only
will this increased level of American maritime activity necessitate
expanded regulation and policing by the United States Govern-
ment, it also will require physical protection from the depredations
of a disaffected international criminal element.8 Finally, until the
4. See 1 THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 4 (1980). See generally Langloe, A
Stinking Mess, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 44; Morgenthau, Don't Go Near the Water, NEWS-
WEEK, Aug. 1, 1988, at 42; Toufexis, The Dirty Seas, TIME, Aug. 1, 1988, at 44; Wiley, Phe-
nomena, Comment, and Notes, SMITHSONIAN, Sept. 1988, at 32.
5. This forecast applies with equal force to the nations of Central America, South
America and th,3 Caribbean. 1 THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1-2 (1980);
Gardner, The Case for Practical Internationalism, 66 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 827, 831 (1988).
Mexico, for example, is saddled with a galloping inflation rate, a staggering foreign debt,
growing political dissension and a strikingly unequal distribution of wealth. Ratliff, The Fu-
ture of Latin-American Insurgencies, in LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCIES 161, 185 (F. Georges
ed. 1986); Lake, Mexico On the Brink, NAT'L REV., Jun. 10, 1988, at 30, 31. Merely to main-
tain the status quo, Mexico would have to create more than one million new jobs every year.
Chace, A New Grand Strategy, 70 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 22 (1988).
6. UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMIC TRANSITION 28 (1988).
7. United States demographic patterns portend a national environment in which a sub-
stantial and widening gap exists between a major population segment that is aging, white,
well-educated and relatively well-off, and an equally significant segment that is increasingly
young, ethnic, poorly educated and economically disadvantaged. Demographic Changes in
the United States: The Economic and Social Consequences into the Twenty-first Century,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Ec-
onomics of the Joint Economic Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1986). This is a classic
recipe for societal disorder. A sharp increase in criminal activity is almost certain to result.
Experience confirms that Americans take crime with them when they go to sea.
8. See Stavridis, Resource Wars, 983 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 72 (1985) (suggesting that on
the high seas the United States Navy may soon need to function as did the United States
Army's cavalry in the American West, protecting scattered outposts of civilization in a bar-
ren and hostile environment).
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United States repeals its current federal narcotics legislation, the
massive drug smuggling problem at sea will continue to challenge
maritime law enforcement. 9
Traditionally, the United States Coast Guard has performed the
nation's high seas law enforcement functions.10 Today, however,
the volume and scope of the Coast Guard's duties tax its ability to
police the seas.11 Expanded high seas law enforcement duties in
the future will likely be more than the Coast Guard can handle.
One obvious solution to the need for an expanded law enforce-
ment presence at sea is the United States Navy. With a fleet of
more than 500 ships, more than one-half million officers and en-
listed personnel, and a worldwide maritime surveillance, tracking
and communications network, the Navy has the capability to en-
hance substantially the nation's high seas law enforcement ef-
forts. 2 Recently, however, courts and commentators have raised
questions regarding the legality of employing the Navy to enforce
federal civilian law.13
9. See generally S. WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (1986);
Nadelmann, U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export, 70 FOREIGN POL'Y 83 (1988).
10. In 1790, Congress created the Coast Guard's predecessor, the United States Revenue
Marine, to assist in enforcing the country's customs laws. In the nearly two centuries since,
the Coast Guard has remained the primary maritime police force of the United States Gov-
ernment. See generally R. JOHNSON, GUARDIANS OF THE SEA (1987).
11. Law enforcement is only one of the Coast Guard's three principal missions, the other
two being search and rescue, and military readiness. Beyond these three primary missions
are a plethora of secondary duties that occupy an enormous amount of the Service's time
and effort. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, COMMUNITY RELATIONS
BRANCH, THE COAST GUARD, AN OvERvIEw (1988) [hereinafter THE COAST GUARD, AN OVER-
vmw]. To carry out its duties, the Coast Guard can only call upon a force of some 37,000
active duty servicemen and a fleet of fifty seagoing ships. Id. at 6, 16. Moreover, despite a
considerable expansion in the Coast Guard's workload over the past several years, the Ser-
vice's budget has suffered a prolonged decline. See infra note 229. The prospect of a signifi-
cant turnaround in the future is not very good. Id.
12. JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1989-90 690-91 (R. Sharpe ed. 1989). If the personnel strength
of the Marine Corps is included in this assessment, the overall size of the Navy swells to
more than 750,000 officers and enlisted personnel. Id.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839
(1986); United States v. Del Prado-Montero, 740 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S.
1021 (1984); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
876 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Gerena, 649 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Conn. 1986);
Note, The Navy's Role in Interdicting Narcotics Traffic: War on Drugs or Ambush on the
Constitution?, 75 GEO. L.J. 1947 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Navy's Role]; Note, Fourth
Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law
Enforcement, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Fourth Amendment];
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The Posse Comitatus Act of 187814 is the principal basis for con-
temporary legal challenge to the Navy's civilian law enforcement
authority. A century-old relic of the nation's failed experiment
with Radical Reconstruction, this re-invigorated1 5 legislation does
not mention the Navy when it restricts use of certain branches of
the United States armed forces for civilian law enforcement.16 Al-
though not long ago the judiciary characterized it as both "obscure
and all-but-forgotten,' 17 the statute has become a major factor in
the conduct of the Navy's contemporary law enforcement activity
at sea. The Act is criminally proscriptive in nature 8 and is aimed
directly at limiting Army and Air Force involvement in law en-
forcement. 19 Application of the Act to the Navy would hobble
United States Government efforts to police the oceans of the
world-an unnecessary and undesirable outcome.
Note, Don't Call Out the Marines: An Assessment of the Posse Comitatus Act, 13 Tax.
TECH. L. REV. 1467 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Don't Call Out the Marines].
14. Ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988)). The
Act states: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id. A posse comitatus refers to the body of
citizens pressed into service by the normal civilian law enforcement authority of a given
jurisdiction (typically a county sheriff or federal marshall) to assist in the enforcement of
the law. See infra note 96.
15. Congress has amended the Posse Comitatus Act five times in the past eight years.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180,
§ 1243, 101 Stat. 1163 (1987); Defense Drug Interdiction Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§§ 3051, 3053, 3056, 3057, 100 Stat. 3207-74 to 79 (1986); Department of Defense Authoriza-
tion Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, § 1423(a), 99 Stat. 752 (1985); Department of Defense
Authorization Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1405(9)-(10), 98 Stat. 2622 (1984); Depart-
ment of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905(a)(1), 95 Stat. 1114
(1981). All Acts are codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-80 (1988). These changes are
due, at least in part, to the relatively recent desire to make military resources available to
assist in combating illicit narcotics trafficking.
16. The Act mentions only the Army and the Air Force. See supra note 14.
17. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918
(1949).
18. See supra note 14. Although the Posse Comitatus Act established a federal felony
more than 110 years ago, no one has ever been prosecuted for allegedly violating its terms.
Jackson v. State, 572 P.2d 87, 90 n.9 (Alaska 1977); Note, Fourth Amendment, supra note
13, at 408; Note, A Proposal for Direct Use of the United States Military in Drug Enforce-
ment Operations Abroad, 23 Tax. INT'L L.J. 291, 299 (1988) [hereinafter Note, A Proposal
for Direct Use].
19. See supra note 14.
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This Note considers first the propriety of applying the Act's lim-
itations to the Navy's 20 enforcement of civilian law at sea. The Act
does not proscribe indirect assistance in enforcing the law.2 Conse-
quently, this discussion will focus primarily on the legality of di-
rect enforcement activity-searches, seizures and arrests. The Note
further examines only naval activity conducted on, over or under
international waters because applying the Act to naval units and
personnel operating within United States' territory is sufficiently
analogous to the situation the Army and Air Force face under the
statute, and has been sufficiently treated elsewhere.22 Finally, the
Note recommends alternatives for resolving today's uncertainty
surrounding the Posse Comitatus Act, maximizing the United
States' law enforcement effectiveness at sea, and protecting civil
liberties.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Use of the Armed Forces to Enforce Civilian Law
The framers of the Constitution were determined to limit the
military's role in civilian life after experiencing the unpopular use
of British troops to maintain order in the American colonies during
the decade prior to independence.23 An intense distrust of standing
armies permeated the former colonists' lives and found expression
in a number of contemporary political writings. For example, the
Declaration of Independence complained of military interference
20. For purposes of this discussion and unless otherwise indicated, the term "Navy" re-
fers to both the United States Navy and members of the United States Marine Corps serv-
ing with naval units at sea. Although the Marine Corps is unquestionably a part of the Navy
Department and, like the Navy, is not mentioned specifically in the language of the Posse
Comitatus Act, the distinctions between Marine Corps personnel serving ashore and United
States Army soldiers are relatively minor, and most of the legal limitations affecting the
enforcement activity of the latter would probably apply to the former as well.
21. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Furman, Restrictions Upon the Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse
Comitatus Act, 7 MI. L. REV. 85, 91-92 (1960); Meeks, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding
Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MI. L. REV. 83, (1975); Note,
Recent Developments Relating to the Posse Comitatus Act, 1983 ARMY LAW. 1.
23. See Meeks, supra note 22, at 86-87; see also J. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION 84
(1966) (British military interference in the colonists' lives, especially in New England, was a
major factor in the move towards independence); 1 SOURCES OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 127
(1960).
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in civilian affairs,24 and a number of state constitutions subse-
quently included proscriptions on the use of military force against
civilians.25 The new nation's Articles of Confederation also prohib-
ited the maintenance of most organized armed forces in time of
peace.2 6
The Constitution reflects a general concern about potential dan-
gers associated with a standing army. The document creates a
scheme in which the armed forces must answer to a civilian com-
mander in chief;27 Congress possesses exclusive control over key
factors relating to the military's maintenance and use;28 the popu-
lation at large may bear arms; 9 troops may not be quartered in
civilian homes in time of peace;30 a strong citizen militia is en-
couraged;3 1 and the militia alone is expressly empowered to assist
in enforcing the laws of the nation.32 Moreover, in urging ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, one of its principal authors, Alexander
Hamilton, stressed the document's capacity to keep the nation's
military forces from playing a deleterious role in the day-to-day
operation of peacetime civil society.3 3
In spite of the framers' desire to hold the nation's military power
in check, they did not prohibit use of the Army and Navy in en-
forcing the law of the land. Although the Constitution specifically
gives responsibility for faithfully executing the laws of the United
States to the commander in chief,34 it places no express limitation
on his ability to employ the military in discharging his law enforce-
ment obligation. 5 The Constitution's ink was barely dry before
24. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
25. Engdahl, Foundations for Military Intervention in the United States, in MIIrrARY
INTERVENTION IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 4 (1985).
26. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. VI, § 4.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
28. Id. at art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 12, 14.
29. Id. at amend. II.
30. Id. at amend. III.
31. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
32. Id. at cl. 15.
33. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 28, 29 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
34. U.S. CONsT. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
35. Taken together, articles II, III, and IV of the Constitution may authorize the Presi-
dent to use the armed forces in whatever manner he deems reasonable and necessary to
carry out his chief executive function. Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction
Politics Reconsidered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 703, 713 (1976); see E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITU-
[Vol. 31:445
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President George Washington led a contingent of federalized
troops into Western Pennsylvania to enforce compliance with the
United States' revenue laws." Although this provoked political de-
bate at the time, the constitutionality of Washington's action ap-
pears to have gone essentially unquestioned.3 7
Americans have long accepted presidential use of either federal
troops or federalized militia to restore order and enforce the law in
times of crisis.38 Most view this expedient as a legitimate exercise
of the chief executive's constitutional power.3 9 Indeed, essentially
the same body of men that created the Constitution specifically
TION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 191-92 (1978) (noting that the President has constitutional
authority to take all measures necessary to ensure that domestic order is maintained and
that the law is enforced); Furman, supra note 22, at 91-92 (stating that the President has
implicit constitutional authority to use the armed forces as needed to enforce the law of the
land). Former President and Chief Justice of the United States William Howard Taft once
observed that
[t]he President is made Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy by the
Constitution evidently for the purpose of enabling him to ... take care that
the laws be faithfully executed. If Congress were to attempt to prevent his use
of the army for [this purpose], the action would be void .... [H]e is to main-
tain the peace of the United States. I think he would have this power under
the Constitution even if Congress had not given him express authority to this
end.
W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 128-29 (1916).
36. The ill-fated Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 provided the occasion for this exercise of the
military's law enforcement power. Pennsylvania farmers refused to pay a federal tax on dis-
tilled spirits and then threatened federal revenue officers sent to the region to collect the
tax. Aided by a judicial determination that the regular civil authority was no longer able to
enforce the law, President Washington determined that the farmers' actions rose to the level
of rebellion against the United States Government. The nation's tiny regular army was en-
gaged in fighting Indians farther to the west and was unavailable for additional duty. Rely-
ing on the inherent power of his office and the authority granted him by the Militia Act of
1792, Washington took nearly 13,000 federalized militiamen into the state to bring the de-
linquent taxpayers to justice. Interestingly enough, this law enforcing "Army of the Consti-
tution" represented the largest military force that George Washington ever commanded in
the field. J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 157-59 (1960); R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES ARMY 100-01 (1967). See generally L. BALDWIN, WHISKEY REBELS (1939).
37. See BALDWIN, supra note 36, at 259-72.
38. See THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1-36 to 1-44 (1978); Furman, supra note 22,
at 87-92, 127 (discussing the frequency and acknowledged propriety of employing federal
troops in this role); see also Engdahl, The New Civil Disturbance Regulations: The Threat
of Military Intervention, 49 IND. L.J. 582, 583-96 (1982) (examining the law allowing use of
federal troops in this role and, while questioning its constitutionality, acknowledging the
popular acceptance of the practice and noting the virtual absence of calls for judicial scru-
tiny of it).
39. See sources listed supra note 38.
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allowed for this contingency when it passed the Militia Act of
1792.40 Today, that Act's legislative progeny empowers the com-
mander in chief to use the armed forces to both assist state govern-
ments41 and enforce federal law42 when regular civil authorities
cannot effectively carry out their own law enforcement duties.43 To
date, American presidents have exercised this discretionary power
on at least thirty-two separate occasions.44 Moreover, the United
40. Technically, the Act of 1792 provided for aiding the states only through use of a fed-
eralized militia. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 331
(1982)). No interpretive significance can be attached to omission of the regular army from
the Act because that force was so small at the time. Furman, supra note 22, at 88 (citing
CORWIN, THE PRESIDEN1. OFFICES AND POWERS 1787-1957 131 (1957)); see Engdahl, supra
note 25, at 12. Because Washington employed militiamen to quell the Whiskey Rebellion,
contemporary Philadelphians concluded that the insurrection would "'establish the princi-
ple that a standing army was necessary for enforcing the laws.'" BALDWIN, supra note 36, at
112 (quoting Madison). Consequently, Congress modified the Militia Act, amending the
statute to include specifically the regular "land or naval force" of the nation as well. Militia
Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
41. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). The most recent amendment to this section of the Code substi-
tuted "armed forces" for "land or naval forces" of the United States. Act of Aug. 10, 1956,
Pub. L. No. 1028, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 15. In all other relevant respects, this section is un-
changed from the original statute of 1792.
42. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1988). Unlike the provision for aiding state governments in times of
domestic strife, Congress did not revise the language of this section to provide specifically
for use of the "land and naval forces" of the United States until the outset of the Civil War.
Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (1861). As with the preceding section of the Code,
that language was ultimately revised to refer to the nation's "armed forces." Act of Aug. 10,
1956, Pub. L. No. 1028, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 15 (1956); see 50 U.S.C. § 220 (1982) (a Civil
War-era statute that provides specifically for armed forces' assistance in enforcing customs
laws in time of rebellion or civil disorder).
43. So strong is the general acceptance of this practice that even the debates surrounding
the Posse Comitatus Act did little to shake either the popular or official conviction that such
use of federal troops falls within the scope of the President's constitutional grant of author-
ity. In -fact, President Rutherford B. Hayes planned to use this enforcement power to put
down yet another whiskey rebellion, this time in South Carolina, within weeks of the Posse
Comitatus Act's enactment. T. WILLIAMS, HAYES, THE DIARY OF A PRESIDENT 155 (1964). Less
than four months later, Hayes ordered federal troops into New Mexico to enforce judicial
process. Furman, supra note 22, at 97.
44. THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1-42 (1978) (This figure represents the number of
instances in which the President has issued a Proclamation to Disperse pursuant to 10
U.S.C. § 334 (1988) in immediate anticipation of committing federal troops or federalized
militia to restore local order in a time of civil strife.). But see THE GENERAL SERVICE
SCHOOLS, MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER 185 (1925) ("From the adoption of the Consti-
tution to the present time [1925], federal troops have been used in the suppression of do-
mestic disturbances on more than a hundred separate occasions.").
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States Supreme Court eliminated any doubt as to the constitution-
ality of the practice a century ago.45
Congress has often authorized use of the nation's armed forces
to either enforce or assist in the enforcement of a wide range of
federal "civilian" laws. Today, these statutory grants of military
enforcement power include protecting and assisting the investiga-
tion of crimes against foreign diplomats and high government offi-
cials,46 protecting Indian and public lands,47 supporting the na-
tion's neutrality,48 enforcing health and quarantine laws, 49 assisting
in the enforcement of offshore fisheries laws,50 executing warrants
relating to enforcement of federal civil rights legislation,5 and
even protecting the rights of the discoverer of a guano island.52 De-
spite the considerable diversity of this legislation's subject matter
and its enactment at intervals over most of the nation's history,53
no significant constitutional challenge to the military enforcement
45. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 112(f) (1982) (protecting foreign diplomats and government officials); 18
U.S.C. § 351(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (protecting members of Congress, cabinet officers,
certain candidates for political office and justices of the Supreme Court); 18 U.S.C. § 1751(i)
(1982) (protecting the President, the Vice President and senior members of their staffs).
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 23, 78, 593 (1982) (prevention and removal of trespassers in national
parks and federal timber reserves in Florida); 25 U.S.C. § 180 (1982) (removal of trespassers
from Indian lands); 43 U.S.C. § 1065 (1982) (destruction or removal of unlawful enclosures
on public lands).
48. 22 U.S.C. § 408 (1982) (preventing illegal exportation of war materials); 22 U.S.C. § 461
(1982) (enforcing neutrality law with regard to vessels armed for war); 22 U.S.C. § 462 (1982)
(addressing the detention or expulsion of foreign vessels in or from United States waters to
maintain the nation's status as neutral).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 97 (1982).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1989 (1982).
52. 48 U.S.C. § 1418 (1982). Not only may the discoverer of such an island be protected at
the President's discretion by the full might of the United States armed forces, but protec-
tion is extended to the discoverer's widow and heirs as well! Id.
53. For example, the health and quarantine provisions derived from an eighteenth cen-
tury statute (Act of Feb. 25, 1799, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 619), the civil rights enforcement power
was provided for in a mid-nineteenth century statute (Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
28), authorization to use federal troops to protect Yosemite and Sequoia National Parks
originated at the outset of this century (Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 791, 31 Stat. 618), and
provision for using military resources to assist in enforcing federal fishing regulations was
enacted little more than a decade ago (The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982)).
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provisions has ever arisen.14 Even when finding a violation of the
Posse Comitatus Act, one federal court of appeals conceded that
"the policy consideration underlying the ... Act is not absolute." 55
Only recently has the issue of using military resources to enforce
federal civilian law come under constitutional scrutiny.56 The ori-
gin of this nascent debate is found in the Supreme Court's consid-
eration of a Vietnam-era first amendment case, Laird v. Tatum. "
In Tatum, the Court addressed a situation involving the Army's
domestic gathering of intelligence in the late 1960s.5 8 Although the
Court determined that no constitutional violation existed, it never-
theless commented in dictum that military involvement in civilian
affairs was a matter of grave concern." In particular, the Court
noted that American resistance to military intrusion in civilian life
had "deep roots in our history," and found early expression in both
the third amendment and the Constitution's provisions for civilian
control of the military.60 In a spirited dissent, Justice Douglas ob-
served that the Constitution distinguishes clearly between the use
of militia and regular troops in enforcing the law, and that the
framers intended the former to be used only for that purpose.6
54. The only challenges raised have been directed at the provisions concerning the neu-
trality laws. See supra note 48. Even then, federal courts found no bar to the reasonable
exercise of this power. In 1818, the Supreme Court opined that the authority to use land or
naval forces for enforcement of the predecessor of 22 U.S.C. § 461 existed only when the civil
authority was unable to enforce the law. Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 331-33
(1818). In 1912, a federal district court found that the military had overstepped its bounds
as provided for in the predecessor of 22 U.S.C. § 462 when it failed to turn a civilian suspect
over to civilian authorities within a reasonable time after his warrantless arrest. Ex parte
Orozco, 201 F. 106, 112 (W.D. Tex. 1912).
55. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 377 n.11 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983
(1974).
56. As recently as 1982, the United States Department of Justice stated that no constitu-
tional basis existed for requiring a separation of military and civilian law enforcement activ-
ity. Zimmerman, Posse Comitatus: A New Law Lifts the Ban On Military Participation in
Anti-Drug Smuggling Operations, 9 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 17, 18 (1982).
57. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Legal commentators had not previously dwelled upon the issue to
any great extent. For example, prior to the 1972 Tatum case, the only significant examina-
tion of the issue in light of the Posse Comitatus Act's statutory limitations disregarded the
existence of any constitutional dimension to the matter. Furman, supra note 22, at 87-92.
58. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 2-3.
59. Id. at 15-16.
60. Id. at 15; see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
61. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 16-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In making his point, Douglas
quoted framer Luther Martin saying "'when a government wishes to deprive its citizens of
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More than a decade passed before Tatum's dictum bore substan-
tial juridical fruit. That occasion came in a 1985 Eighth Circuit
case, Bissonette v. Haig,62 that grew out of the 1973 occupation of
the Indian reservation at Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Once
again, the Army's involvement in civilian affairs was at issue. 3
This time, however, the court concluded that the issue of military
participation in civilian law enforcement activity rose to a consti-
tutional level of concern.6 4 Expanding on the Supreme Court's dic-
tum in Tatum, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit deter-
mined that such conduct potentially imperiled first, fourth and
fifth amendment personal freedoms.6 Nevertheless, the court ulti-
mately decided that no constitutional transgression had occurred.6
The balance of the federal bench's opinions does not reflect the
Eighth Circuit's willingness to find a constitutional dimension to
the question of military enforcement of civilian laws. On the one
hand, in United States v. Gerena,67 a federal district court cited
freedom, and reduce them to slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army.'" Id. at 18
(Douglas, J., dissenting). This danger, Douglas warned, "exists not only in bold acts of usur-
pation of power, but also in gradual encroachments." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. 776 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd on rehearing, 800 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1986) (en
banc), aff'd, 485 U.S. 264 (1988).
63. The defense alleged that a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act had taken place. Id.
at 1385-86. At Wounded Knee, the Army provided and maintained equipment loaned to
civilian law enforcement agencies, provided an aerial surveillance flight, and offered techni-
cal and tactical advice concerning how the civilian agencies might best resolve the confron-
tation. See United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 921 (D.S.D. 1975); United States
v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Neb. 1974), dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir.
1975).
64. Bissonette, 776 F.2d at 1387.
65. "[M]ilitary enforcement of the civil law leaves the protection of vital Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights in the hands of persons who are not trained to uphold these rights. It
may also chill the exercise of fundamental rights, such as the rights to speak freely and to
vote." Id. The court in Bissonette ignored the possibility that military personnel could be
trained to uphold the individual civil rights cited. Note, A Proposal for Direct Use, supra
note 18, at 302 n.92. This omission represents a significant gap in the court's logic.
66. To reach this conclusion, the court fashioned a two-part test to determine whether an
unreasonable interference with civilians' rights had taken place. Bissonette, 776 F.2d at
1389. This approach departed sharply from a history of interest-balancing to determine the
constitutional reasonableness of government conduct. See Note, Fourth Amendment, supra
note 13, at 430-31.
67. 649 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Conn. 1986) (involving the use of Navy helicopters and two Air
Force bases to facilitate the transfer of a politically sensitive federal prisoner and his Mar-
shal's Service custodians from Puerto Rico to Connecticut).
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Bissonette with approval, 6 agreeing that questions concerning the
armed forces' enforcement activity in the civilian community in-
volved a constitutional interest in "maintaining a society free from
military dominance." '69 On the other hand, a number of other cir-
cuits remain unconvinced, however. In the past six years, the
First,70 Fourth,71 Fifth72 and Ninth73 Circuit Courts of Appeals
have all considered cases involving military law enforcement, but
none discussed the issue in constitutional terms.71 At most, there-
fore, the use of military resources to enforce civilian law can be
described as a developing but unsettled area of constitutional law.
The Special Case of the Navy
Even assuming that the Constitution limits the United States
armed forces' ability to enforce civilian law, no compelling reason
exists to extend such a limitation to United States Navy units op-
erating on, over or under the high seas. 5 The framers of the Con-
stitution contemplated that the few dangers inherent in a standing
navy were distinct from and far less significant than the hazards
associated with the creation and maintenance of a military force
ashore.76 Then, just as now, Americans viewed the existence of a
sizable permanent navy as more of a threat to economic well-being
68. Id. at 1182.
69. Id. at 1183. Like Bissonette, the court in Gerena conceded that "not every military
involvement rises to the level of constitutional ignominy," id. at 1182, and determined that
no constitutional violation had occurred. Id. at 1183.
70. United States v. Del Prado-Montero, 740 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1021 (1984).
71. United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987).
72. United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1986).
73. Showengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987).
74. See United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir.) (in which the court com-
mented on the "novel[ty]" of an argument that a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act
might violate the accused's constitutional rights), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973).
75. By definition, the term "high seas" refers to waters outside the territorial limits of
any state. B. BRITIN & L. WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 121 (1981).
76. The framers distinguished between the two by limiting appropriations for the Army
to no more than two years, but placing no similar limit on the expenditure of funds "to
provide and maintain a navy." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13. Moreover,
[i]n reviewing the work of the Constitutional Convention one finds no trace of
a discussion of naval power apart from the general war power. There was a
good deal of debate which was concerned with the danger to popular liberty
from a standing army or from the abuse of state militia by the proposed fed-
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and international peace than to individual liberty or democracy. 77
Moreover, navies traditionally enforced the laws of a sovereign
state at sea.78 Far from objecting to the new American nation's
continuation of this practice, both the framers and their immediate
successors embraced the idea of using the Navy to enforce civilian
laws and encouraged its application.9
Significantly, the concept of a popular militia pervades the Con-
stitution 0 and most discussions of the American military's consti-
eral government, but no one cited a standing navy as a menace to the liberty
of the whole people.
M. SMELSER, THE CONGRESS FOUNDS THE NAvY 1787-1798 6 (1959) (emphasis added).
The principal reason for the divergent views of the different branches of the service was
that navies, by their nature, were unable to intervene in domestic politics or to threaten
personal liberties ashore. Madison, for example, wrote that he was especially pleased that
the new nation's primary means of defense would be a strong navy because its batteries
could never be used by the government to endanger fundamental American freedoms. The
naval clause of the Constitution, Madison noted, had not excited the kind of opposition that
seemed to trouble the rest of the document. W. MILLIS, ARMtS AND MEN 49-50 (1956). See
generally J. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW (1981) (discussing the colonial era standing army
controversy against the backdrop of both the English and American constitutions).
77. S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 156 (1957); see SMELSER, supra note 76,
at 17 (Opponents to an unlimited power to maintain a navy at the Constitutional Conven-
tion objected to the clause on the very different grounds that "[iut would ... arouse Euro-
pean nations against the United States," and because "the United States could not afford a
navy.").
78. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text. In fact, Great Britain intensively em-
ployed ships of the Royal Navy to enforce the English revenue laws in the period prior to
America's independence. See generally T. BARROW, TRADE AND EMPIRE (1967). Nevertheless,
unlike the case in which British troops were present in American civilian life, the literature
of the colonial period and the constitutional debates that followed are virtually silent re-
garding the propriety of a navy engaged in law enforcement work offshore. See supra notes
23, 76 and accompanying text.
79. Among the first acts of the framer-dominated Congress under the Constitution was
passage of the Revenue Act of 1789. Revenue Act of 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29. Although the
nation possessed no navy at the time, the Act authorized the appointment of "naval of-
ficer[s]" as officers of the customs in various American ports and empowered them to en-
force the revenue laws of the United States. Id., 1 Stat. at 43. A year later-and in the
continued absence of a national navy-the same body passed the Revenue Act of 1790,
which authorized the creation of a force of revenue cutters for the enforcement of customs
laws afloat. Revenue Act of 1790, ch. 35, § 62, 1 Stat. 145, 175. Accordingly, almost at the
outset of the nation under the Constitution, Congress established a federal maritime scheme
in which the nation's only "navy" was assigned civilian law enforcement activity as one of
its primary organizational duties.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
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tutional role in civil society.81 Those who see a constitutional limit
on the use of federal military resources to enforce civilian law
ground much of their belief in the framers' preference for the use
of state militiamen."2 Although the country's militia survives today
in the form of the Army and Air Force National Guards, no analo-
gous system of state naval forces remains. 3 Even if such a system
existed, it would be inapplicable to the enforcement issue on the
high seas. The raison d'etre of a state militia is the defense of the
territorial integrity and domestic order of its respective state.84
The high seas, however, are located outside the territory of any of
the states.8 5 Because the framers envisioned the occasional need
for some military enforcement of the nation's laws,8 6 the nation's
Navy, at the very least, should be authorized to perform that func-
tion at sea as the natural substitute for the analogous use of state
militia forces ashore.
The Constitution authorizes the use of military resources to en-
force the law when civil authorities are unable to cope with the
challenge.87 This authorization is particularly relevant in determin-
ing the Navy's high seas enforcement role because civilian law en-
forcement activity generally stops at the boundaries of the nation's
81. See, e.g., MILITARY INTERVENTION IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES (1985); Furman, supra
note 22, at 100-02; Meeks, supra note 22, at 88; Seimer & Effron, Military Participation in
United States Law Enforcement Activities Overseas: The Extraterritorial Effect of the
Posse Comitatus Act, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 24 n.106 (1979); Note, A Proposal for Direct
Use, supra note 18, at 293-94.
82. See sources listed supra note 81; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 16-24 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the militia from the armed forces and arguing that
the Army's surveillance of citizens' political activity was unconstitutional).
83. The absence of a naval militia has been a fairly constant feature of American military
history Although a number of state naval militias were created around the turn of this
century, Congress legislated virtually all of them out of existence during the First World
War. Most of the defunct militias' membership joined the new United States Naval Reserve.
See Akers, The Groundwork for Today's Naval Reserve, 434 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROc. 494-500
(1939). Today, naval militias exist only in New York and Alaska, where they are employed
principally in disaster relief work ashore. Telephone interview with Commander Tom
Straugh, Commanding Officer, Alaska Naval Militia (July 3, 1989); Telephone interview
with Mr. Charles Carrol, Personnel Coordinator, New York Naval Militia (July 5, 1989).
84. See generally S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 77, at 169-73.
85. See supra note 75.
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
87. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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territorial sea.88 No comprehensive civil authority exists that would
be supplanted by Navy law enforcement activity carried out more
than three miles offshore. On the contrary, the exclusion of naval
units from active law enforcement at sea converts the oceans' sur-
face into a kind of legal "no man's land," in which the enforcement
of United States law is the exception instead of the rule. 9 Any
constitutional concern regarding military enforcement activity's
displacement of its civil counterpart therefore is inapplicable to
the Navy's work performed on the high seas.90
No credible constitutional challenge arises from using the Navy
to enforce civilian law on the high seas. The Constitution offers no
prohibition of such activity. Instead, the document implicitly au-
thorizes use of the Navy in civilian law enforcement.91 The framers
accepted this idea without significant objection, and no major pol-
icy reasons have arisen since to undermine the validity of their de-
termination. Consequently, the only meaningful legal impediments
to a high seas Navy enforcement power must emerge from either
federal statutory law or public policy concerns.
THE STATUTORY QUESTION
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878
The most significant legal impediment to the Navy's enforce-
ment of civilian law at sea is the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.92
88. See Seimer & Effron, supra note 81, at 54.
89. Ashore, closeness of society results in crimes being observed and reported almost as
they occur. The same cannot be said of crimes taking place on the unpopulated reaches of
the high seas. The immense geographic challenges implicit in the situation are overwhelming
and seaborne criminal activity may go undiscovered or unpunished as a result.
90. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
92. Ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988)); see
supra note 14. Today's Posse Comitatus Act was originally § 15 of the Army Appropriation
Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152. This Act was later codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1956). In 1956, Congress repealed the amended Act and reenacted its substance, which
is presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988).
Prior to the amendments since 1981, see supra note 15, Congress had amended the Posse
Comitatus Act on three occasions: Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 29, 31 Stat. 321, 330 (ex-
cepting the territory of Alaska from the operation of the Act); Reenacted Act of Aug. 10,
1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1028, § 18(a), 70A Stat. 626 (including the United States Air Force
upon its separation from the Army-the Air Force was separated from the Army in the
National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, §§ 207, 208, 61 Stat. 495, 502); and Alaska Omnibus
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Nevertheless, this statute's origin did not involve the nation's
Navy, nor did the legislators' enacting the measure indicate an in-
tent to bind the Navy.93 Even if such an intention existed, no evi-
dence supports a belief that the Act's limitations apply to naval
units operating on the high seas. 4 Instead, the Navy's principal
hurdle to law enforcement at sea is an executive policy determina-
tion that extends the otherwise inapplicable Posse Comitatus Act's
proscriptions to the Navy. 5 This possible restriction of Navy law
enforcement, therefore, is largely attributable to the Navy's own
implementation of the policy determination, not congressional
action.
The common law historically supported employing a posse comi-
tatus to assist in law enforcement.9 6 The Judiciary Act of 178911
continued the practice in the United States. Although the Act is
silent on employing the military as part of the posses it authorized,
American jurists and scholars generally accepted this power as im-
plicit in the statute's language.9 ' In any event, using American
soldiers and sailors as members of numerous posses comitatus was
a common feature of the United States' early legal history.9
Not until the period immediately before the American Civil War
did popular objection to the use of troops for law enforcement pur-
Act, Pub. L. No. 86-70, § 17(d), 73 Stat. 141, 144 (1959) (repealing the Alaskan exception on
the occasion of Alaska's attaining statehood).
93. See infra notes 103-05, 125-27 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
96. The term "posse comitatus" literally means "[t]he power or force of the county."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1046 (5th ed. 1979). The posse's name was derived from the en-
tourage that accompanied early Roman proconsuls on their travels through the countryside.
Later, under the common law of England, the term referred to the power of a sheriff to
summon all able-bodied men over the age of 15 to assist him in pursuing felons and in
maintaining public peace. Several states now prescribe the duties and responsibilities of the
posse comitatus by statute. Furman, supra note 22, at 87.
97. Ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (presently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 569(b) (1982)).
98. Furman, supra note 22, at 87; see 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 162, 163 (1878) (power to sum-
mon soldiers, sailors and marines as a posse comitatus implicit in the terms of the 1789
statute); 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466 (1954). But see 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 71 (1881); 17 Op. Att'y Gen.
242, 243 (1881) (implicit power to summon members of the military as a posse comitatus
forbidden by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878); 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 162 (1978).
99. Furman, supra note 22, at 87.
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poses warrant even an abortive legislative response. 100 Later, per-
ceived military excesses in the years of Reconstruction inflamed
the same passions.10° Consequently, in 1877 and 1878, legislation
limiting the Army's power to enforce the law appeared again on
the congressional agenda.102 The primary motivation behind both
of these initiatives concerned Army law enforcement activities. 0 3
The debates surrounding the 1878 measure focused on the dangers
associated with the Army's intrusion into civilian affairs. 04 Conse-
quently, the Posse Comitatus Act, the result of these deliberations,
addressed only Army activity.10 5
100. In response to the use of the Army to suppress the "Kansas disorders" of the 1850s,
some congressmen tried to amend the Army Appropriation Act of 1856 to prohibit the em-
ployment of any part of the military force in a posse comitatus. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th
Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1856); see also U.S. GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS, MILITARY AID TO THE
CIvIL POWER 187-89 (1925) (a brief discussion of the Army's law enforcement activity in
Kansas from 1854-58).
101. See infra notes 102-03.
102. The 1877 legislation, like that of 1856 and 1878, was proposed as a rider to the rou-
tine Army Appropriation Bill. The language of the 1877 measure differed from that of 1878
in that it was much more narrowly drawn and focused primarily upon use of the Army to
keep pretenders in positions of governmental authority within the reconstructed South. See
5 CONG. REC. 2152 (1877). Nevertheless, the debates surrounding both this failed amend-
ment and the appropriation bill itself indicate that a number of the legislators were eager to
limit the Army's law enforcement power on a much more general level. See Seimer & Effron,
supra note 81, at 19-24. On May 20, 1878, Congressman Kimmel proposed to amend the
year's Army Appropriation Act by providing that "it shall not be lawful to use any part of
the land or naval forces of the United States to execute the laws either as a posse comitatus
or otherwise, except in such cases as may be expressly authorized by an act of Congress." 7
CONG. REC. 3586 (1878) (statement of Rep. Kimmel). This proposal ultimately became the
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.
103. The principal complaints leading to the passage of the 1878 amendment concerned
the Army's role in the South in relation to the bitterly disputed presidential election of
1876, and its employment in the North in response to the 1877 labor disputes in the indus-
trialized regions of the country. 7 CONG. REc. 3538, 3579-86, 3845-50, 4239-48, 4295-304,
4358, 4648, 4684-86 (1878); see U.S. GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS, MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL
POWER, supra note 100, at 189-93 (discussing the law enforcement role of the Army in the
"Kansas disorders" from 1854-58); Furman, supra note 22, at 93-94 (outlining use of federal
troops to restore order in Kansas when pro-slave citizens began taking up arms); Seimer &
Effron, supra note 81, at 24-43 (stating Congress' debate over passing the Posse Comitatus
Act included concerns about the role of the Army in both the 1876 election and the "crash
of 1873," which provoked redress through strikes).
104. The debates surrounding the passage of the Act in 1878 focused on Army activities
almost exclusively. 7 CONG. REC. 3538, 3579-86, 3845-50, 4239-48, 4295-304, 4358, 4648, 4684-
86 (1878).
105. The final version of the Act reads:
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For nearly 100 years, the Posse Comitatus Act remained virtu-
ally untouched by the nation's legal system. Although a handful of
defendants attempted to dust off the legislation, they failed to con-
vince the courts that the Act applied to their controversies. In the
first of these efforts, a nineteenth century federal court rejected
the petitioner's attempt to rely on the Act to overturn a court-
martial conviction for murder. 10 After more than sixty years of
dormancy, in a trio of Second World War treason cases, 107 three
different circuit courts of appeals agreed that the Act did not ap-
ply to law enforcement actions in an occupied enemy land. 108
Twenty-five years later, the same rationale denied another attempt
to apply the Act's proscriptive features to military conduct in an
active war zone. 0 9 Indeed, the Posse Comitatus Act's only signifi-
From and after passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of
the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the
purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under circumstances as
such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitu-
tion or by act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used
to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in viola-
tion of this section and any person willfully violating the provisions of this
section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof
shall be punished by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment
not exceeding two years or by both such fine and imprisonment[.]
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (emphasis added).
106. Ex parte Mason, 256 F. 384 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1882) (soldier assigned to guard duty at
the District of Columbia city jail convicted by Army court-martial of murdering a prisoner
in his custody; sought to have his conviction overturned on the grounds that his assignment
to duty at the civilian facility violated the Posse Comitatus Act and, therefore, his crime was
not committed while subject to lawful military authority and, hence, was not cognizable by a
military court; rejected by the reviewing court because of a Supreme Court determination
that the offense was properly cognizable by a court-martial); see Note, supra note 35, at 717.
107. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935
(1952); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United States,
171 F.2d 921 (lst Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
108. All three cases involved American citizens who made propaganda broadcasts for ei-
ther the Empire of Japan or Nazi Germany during the war; each accused had been appre-
hended by military authorities in the occupied territories and then transferred to the United
States to stand trial in a federal civilian court. D'Aquino, 192 F.2d at 338; Gillars, 182 F.2d
at 962; Chandler, 171 F.2d at 921.
109. United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973)
(civilians suspected of stealing U.S. government property in Vietnam forcefully removed
from that country by American military personnel and returned to the United States for
prosecution in a civilian court).
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cant relevance, prior to 1974, arose in 1961 when the statute barred
a plaintiff's tort claim against the Air Force for violating the Act.11
In the middle of the 1970s, however, two unrelated events in-
jected the Posse Comitatus Act with new vigor, relevance and
meaning. The first event involved the 1973 armed occupation of
the American Indian reservation at Wounded Knee, South Da-
kota.'11 Radical members of the American Indian Movement occu-
pied the town for a little more than two months. 12 The Indians
hoped to draw attention to the plight of their people in the face of
alleged violations of Indian treaty rights by the United States Gov-
ernment. 3 During this episode, the United States Army provided
and maintained equipment used by the civilian law enforcement
agencies, offered advice and undertook a surveillance flight of the
area in a military helicopter." 4
In the wake of the Wounded Knee confrontation, a series of re-
lated cases"15 resulted in the first detailed judicial examination of
the Posse Comitatus Act and offered the first meaningful legal
guidelines concerning the statute's application. Although all the
courts considered the same evidence, each took a slightly different
approach to the issue. The result was a collective judicial product
comprising "a confusing patchwork" of relevant legal standards.
11 6
As a consequence, the proper test in determining a violation of the
Posse Comitatus Act is far from clear today. The court in United
110. Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (An Air Force helicopter
used in the search for an escaped civilian prisoner struck a tree, causing debris to injure a
bystander; the bystander's attempt at a recovery from the government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act failed because, by violating the Posse Comitatus Act, the helicopter pilot
was no longer acting within the scope of his authority as an officer of the United States
Government.).
111. See generally A. JOSEPHY, J&, Now THAT THE BUFFALO'S GONE 246-52 (1982).
112. Id.
113. The Indians were particularly concerned about the United States' violation of its
1868 treaty with the Sioux nation. See id.
114. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
115. Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd on rehearing, 800 F.2d 812
(8th Cir. 1986)(en banc), aff'd, 485 U.S. 264 (1988); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp.
186 (D.N.D. 1975), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D.
1975); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974), dismissed, 510 F.2d 808
(8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D. 1974).
116. Note, Fourth Amendment, supra note 13, at 413. For a detailed discussion of the
diverse holdings of these nearly identical cases, see id. at 408-13, 428-30.
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States v. McArthur"17 formulated the test most frequently used:
The Act is violated when military activity subjects civilian suspects
to an exercise of military power that is "regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory in nature.""" Other courts, particularly at the state
level, use a less mechanical approach, deciding the issue based
upon a determination of whether military participation in the
event was merely incidental to permissible military activity." 9 Un-
derlying the states' formulation is the ultimate question whether
the military participation in civilian law enforcement is "passive"
in nature.2 0
The other critical Posse Comitatus Act event of the mid-1970s
involved the use of United States Marine Corps servicemen in an
undercover operation investigating the illegal possession and sale
of military weapons in a civilian community. The resulting case,
United States v. Walden, 2' is significant for two reasons. First, it
represents a federal court's willingness to find a violation of the
Act by Navy personnel. 122 Second, the case introduced the judicial
practice of not applying the federal exclusionary rule to evidence
gathered while in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. 23 Pursuant
117. 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d
1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977).
118. Id. at 194; see United States v. Hartley, 486 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (using
test expounded in McArthur, Court held Act not violated when assistance is in the form of
handling and testing shrimp after it had been sent to government warehouses), aff'd, 678
F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Gerena, 649 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Conn. 1986) (rul-
ing that the use of military equipment and facilities in transporting civilian defendant to
the courthouse did not violate the Act under McArthur). But see People v. Burden, 94
Mich. App. 209, 288 N.W.2d 392 (1979) (rejecting McArthur test as being unsupported by
any statute or rule of law), rev'd on other grounds, 411 Mich. 56, 303 N.W. 2d 444 (1981).
119. State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573, 575, 260 S.E.2d 629, 639 (1979) (citing Furman, supra
note 22, at 128), cert. denied sub nom. 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
120. See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 303 N.C. 608, 281 S.E.2d 7, cert. denied sub nom. 454
U.S. 973 (1981) (the use of officers in removing military personnel from situations poten-
tially involving breach of civil laws was incidental aid to civilian law enforcement); Nelson,
298 N.C. at 573, 260 S.E.2d at 629 (surrender of evidence to civil authorities for use in
civilian criminal prosecution held to be a "passive" role by military); State v. Trueblood, 46
N.C. App. 541, 265 S.E.2d 662 (1980) (Army officer's role in surveillance of defendant in
civil investigation was "passive" and therefore not violative of the Posse Comitatus Act).
121. 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974).
122. See id. at 373.
123. See id. Common judicial thought now is that the exclusionary rule will be applied
only when violations of the Posse Comitatus Act become sufficiently frequent, id., or egre-
gious, Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522, 524 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). At least one commentator
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to Walden, federal and state courts have resolved occasional Posse
Comitatus controversies without ever reaching the issue of the
statute's violation.124 This judicial practice does not settle the pre-
sent uncertainty regarding the applicable standard for judging the
legality of military enforcement activity.
Until Walden, the Navy was convinced that any Posse Comita-
tus Act limitations applicable to it were self-imposed. The Navy's
view was that "the act is relative to the Army" and "does not ap-
ply to Naval personnel." 2 5 Acceptance of this exception to the Act
derived from both the statute's language and its well-documented
has suggested that imposing the exclusionary rule is unwarranted because the Act does not
provide for the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of its provisions, but does provide
another (criminal) sanction calculated to deter the same conduct. Note, The Posse Comita-
tus Act as an Exclusionary Rule: Is the Criminal to Go Free Because the Soldier Has
Blundered?, 61 N.D.L. REv. 107, 129 (1985). Other commentators, however, have suggested
that the exclusionary rule should be applied more vigorously. Note, Fourth Amendment,
supra note 13, at 428-33 (suggesting that the application of the Posse Comitatus Act be
relaxed in favor of a more strict application of the exclusionary rule as a check on unreason-
able military interference in civilian life); Note, Navy's Role, supra note 13, at 1962-65 (ad-
vocating the use of the exclusionary rule to deter the Navy from engaging in even a con-
structive violation of the principles contained in the Posse Comitatus Act).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839
(1986); United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Danko, 219 Kan. 490,
548 P.2d 819 (1976); cf. United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding Posse
Comitatus Act not violated, but stating that the exclusionary rule would not apply even if
the Act was violated); State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573, 260 S.E.2d 629 (1979) (military's "pas-
sive" role in a civilian criminal investigation did not violate the Act; however, the exclusion-
ary role would not have applied), cert. denied sub nom. 446 U.S. 929 (1980). Contra Taylor
v. State, 645 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (suppressing evidence obtained during arrest
when a military serviceman, in the enforcement of civil law, drew his pistol during the arrest
and participated in the search of defendant's house).
125. Furman, supra note 22, at 98 n.78 (quoting 1954 Op. JAGN 2213, Apr. 6, 1954, 4 Dig.
Ops., LOD, § 15.1). Although the Army sent Posse Comitatus Act implementation guidelines
to its units in the field on two occasions shortly after the statute's passage, the Navy did
not. The Navy obviously did not consider itself bound by the new Army-specific legislation.
See N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1878, at 5, col. 3.
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legislative history. 126 The Posse Comitatus Act's principal scholar
emphatically seconded the exception's existence. 12
Even though the Navy knew that the Posse Comitatus Act did
not limit directly its ability to enforce the law, by the mid-1960s
Navy policy treated the Act as if it did in fact apply to the
Navy.128 Before long, a series of official directives promulgated by
both the Navy and the Department of Defense reflected the Navy's
election to abide by the statute's provisions.' 29 As a result, the
Navy routinely denied civilian requests for assistance in law en-
forcement activity ashore. 30 On the other hand, the use of Marine
Corps helicopters to respond to a New Orleans sniper incident in
1973 demonstrated that the Navy's election to refrain from partici-
pating in civilian law enforcement work was far from absolute.' 3 '
The Navy violated its own regulations again when marines engaged
in the civilian investigative operation addressed in Walden. The
Navy's policy of self-restraint formed the basis for the finding
against the Navy in Walden.132
126. See supra notes 104-05. The only reference to the Navy during the House debate
regarding the Act was in the language of the initial amendment, which sought to impose
restrictions that applied to the "land or naval forces." 7 CONG. REc. 3586 (1878) (statement
of Rep. Kimmel). Similarly, during the debate in the Senate, only two remote suggestions
were made that the proposed amendment might somehow bind the naval service. 7 CONG.
REC. 4297, 4304 (1878)(statements of Sen. Matthews and Sen. Conkling).
127. Furman, supra note 22, at 98 (The "Act imposes no restrictions on the Navy" be-
cause it was "proposed as a result of misuse of the Army and as an amendment to the Army
Appropriation Act.").
128. " 'Although... not prohibited under the Posse Comitatus Act... the policy of the
Navy is to follow the spirit of the statute.'" Meeks, supra note 22, at 101 (quoting 1965 Op.
JAGN 5184, July 23, 1965).
129. Id. The 1968 Department of Defense directive notes that "the Act is regarded as
national policy applicable to all military services of the United States." Id. (quoting DEP'T
OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 3025.1 (June 8 1968)). Virtually the same language exists in the
1971 Defense Department directive. Id. (citing DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 3025.1
(Aug. 19, 1971)). A 1973 Navy directive states that "it is the policy of the Navy and Marine
Corps generally to comply with the restriction imposed by the statute." Id. (citing 1973 Op.
JAGN 1508, Feb. 26, 1973).
130. For example, in 1973 and 1974 the Navy denied requests by local municipalities to
use Navy brig facilities on a temporary basis during repair work to the city's jail because
such civilian use would be impermissible in light of the executive policy decision to apply
the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act to the Navy. Id. at 119.
131. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 2; id. at 22, col. 2; id. at 23, col. 1.
132. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983
(1974).
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Following Walden, both the Navy and the Department of De-
fense continued to apply the Posse Comitatus Act to the Navy as a
matter of executive policy. 3 ' Nevertheless, neither institution has
wavered from its longstanding view that the Act does not apply to
any military service other than the Army and the Air Force.3
During the period between Walden and the 1981 amendments to
the Posse Comitatus Act,"3 5 both the United States Congress and
the Supreme Court of Alaska confirmed the Navy's interpretation
of the statute. In Jackson v. State,3 6 the Supreme Court of Alaska
concluded that the Act encompassed only the Army and Air Force
based upon the Act's legislative history.137 That Congress specifi-
cally deleted mention of the Navy from the original Act and per-
mitted to die a 1974 amendment that would have included the ser-
vice, particularly impressed the court. 38 Later congressional
initiatives to amend the Act by either having "the Armed Forces of
the United States" replace "the Army or the Air Force,"' 39 or mak-
133. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE NAVY, INSTRUCTION No. 5820.7B, Coop-
ERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (Mar. 28, 1988); DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Di-
RECTIVE No. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (Jan. 15,
1986); OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE NAVY, INSTRUCTION No. 5820.7A, COOPERATION
WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (Dec. 13, 1984); DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE
No. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (Mar. 22, 1982);
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE NAVY, INSTRUCTION No. 5820.7, COOPERATION WITH
CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (May 15, 1974); see also 32 C.F.R. § 213 (1987) (Dep't
of Justice Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials).
134. Defense Department and Navy directives make it clear that applying the Act to the
Navy is a matter of policy only. Each empowers the Secretary of the Navy to waive this
limitation as he sees fit. See Navy Instructions and Defense Directives listed supra note 133;
see also 32 C.F.R. § 213 (1987) (Department of Justice Cooperation with Civilian Law En-
forcement Officials); Posse Comitatus Act: Hearings on H.R. 3519 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, 31 (1981) [hereinafter
Hearing on LR. 3519] (statement of William H. Taft IV, Gen. Counsel, Department of
Defense) (testifying that, as of 1981, it was still the Defense Department's unwavering belief
that the Posse Comitatus Act did not apply to the United States Navy).
135. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905(a)(1), 95
Stat. 1114 (1981) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-80 (1988)).
136. 572 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1977).
137. Id. at 93.
138. Id.
139. The Matter of Wiretapping, Electronic Eavesdropping, and Other Surveillance:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Jus-
tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 15, 21 (1975).
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ing the Act specifically applicable to the Navy140 similarly failed to
gain any meaningful legislative momentum. 14  Prior to the 1981
amendments to the statute, the Posse Comitatus Act applied to
the United States Navy only to the extent desired by that service
and the Department of Defense. 4
Even if the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 applied directly to the
Navy, the statute's application probably would not extend to law
enforcement activity on the high seas. Before the Act's 1981
amendments complicated an already uncertain statutory interpre-
tation, commentators generally agreed that the Act did not apply
to actions outside the United States' territory. 143 The Act's geo-
graphic exceptions addressing sites at the margins of the nation's
territory give this interpretation of the statute historic weight. 44
Additionally, an extraterritorial exercise of enforcement power by
any branch of the United States armed forces would not frustrate
the Act's primary purpose145-"precluding the military from sup-
planting or supplementing civilian authorities as the primary in-
struments of law enforcement.' 1 46 Indeed, the fear of exposing ci-
vilian government to the threat of military rule and the suspension
140. UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT OF
1977, S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 1234 (1977) (amendments relating to 10
U.S.C. § 127).
141. See supra notes 139-40. No discussion of these amendments appears in the Congres-
sional Record. See also Seimer & Effron, supra note 81, at 46-47 nn.183-84.
142. See supra notes 105, 125-42 and accompanying text; see also Rice, New Laws and
Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act, 106 MIL. L. REV. 109, 127 (1984); NOTE, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 13, at 407.
143. See Furman, supra note 22, at 107; Seimer & Effron, supra note 81, at 10; Note, A
Proposal for Direct Use, supra note 18, at 294.
144. During the debates surrounding the passage of the original Act, various congressmen
said the Act would not apply in Texas (owing to lawlessness along the border with Mexico)
and in the Pacific Northwest (where problems enforcing American neutrality near Canada
in the face of belligerency between Russia and Great Britain existed). 7 CONG. REc. 3848-49
(1878). Later, problems with enforcing an anti-riot statute in the territory of Alaska
prompted an amendment to the Act that excepted its application there from 1900, Act of
June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 29, 31 Stat. 330, until Alaska attained statehood in 1959, Alaska
Omnibus Act, Pub. L. No. 86-70, § 17(d), 73 Stat. 141 (1959). In the Pacific Ocean, the Act
did not apply in either American Samoa or the Pacific Trust Territories, so long as each was
governed by the United States Navy. See Furman, supra note 22, at 110.
145. Seimer & Effron, supra note 81, at 54; see supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
146. Seimer & Effron, supra note 81, at 54.
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of constitutional liberties147 is irrelevant to activities undertaken
outside United States' territory, provided that those actions are ul-
timately subject to civilian control. 148
The 1981 Amendments
In 1981, Congress again moved to act on the issue of military
assistance in civilian law enforcement activity. Its principal con-
cern was the nation's apparent failing efforts to interdict the im-
portation of massive quantities of illegal drugs.1 49 At the same
time, Congress recognized that the ambiguity surrounding applica-
bility of the Posse Comitatus Act's criminal proscription made lo-
cal military commanders reluctant to provide even permissible as-
sistance to civilian agencies combatting drug smuggling.1 5 Most
legislators agreed that the amendments clarified the limits of legal
military assistance. 5' More difficulty arose, however, with a pro-
posed authorization for the Navy to make searches, seizures and
arrests.5 2 Much of the debate concerning the wisdom of this provi-
sion turned on fears of sending minimally trained military person-
nel into the law enforcement arena.' 53 The legislators' reluctance to
147. As expressed most recently by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bissonette v.
Haig, 776 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1985), afl'd on rehearing, 800 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1986)(en
banc), afl'd, 485 U.S. 264 (1988).
148. See Note, A Proposal for Direct Use, supra note 18, at 301.
149. H.R. REP. No. 71, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NFws 1785, 1785.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The principal dispute was between Rep. Bennett's Armed Services Committee's text
for the proposed amendment, which would have authorized the Navy to make searches,
seizures and arrests, and Rep. White's Judiciary Committee's text, which would not. See,
e.g., 127 CONG. REc. 14,978-80 (1981) (statements of Rep. Bennett and Rep. Hughes).
153. This was the driving force behind resistance to Bennett's more liberal draft of the
amendment. See 127 CONG. REC. 14,979-87, 15,662-88 (1981). Typical was a comment by
Rep. Hughes, who observed that
if we permitted the average military personnel to participate in the arrest or
seizure.. . we would open up Pandora's box, because civilian law enforcement
personnel make enough mistakes now, and they are trained. So if anything,
what we are trying to do is we are trying to minimize the effect of a motion to
suppress.
Id. at 15,665 (statement of Rep. Hughes). Similarly, in referring to the reason why White's
draft did not include the same direct enforcement authorization found in Bennett's propo-
sal, Rep. Sawyer said that "[t]he basic reason for that difference is that it was felt by the
Judiciary Committee that military personnel are not trained in the niceties of civil law en-
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give the Navy direct law enforcement power stemmed principally
from a concern that the government would lose smuggling cases in
court due to the Navy's technical mistakes in the field. 154 Ulti-
mately, the direct enforcement measure failed, the victim of an un-
likely lobbying alliance comprising the federal drug enforcement
agencies, the Pentagon and civil libertarians. 155
The 1981 amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act 5 6 provided
more detailed guidance regarding permissible and prohibited activ-
ity than the original statute of 1878. Moreover, most of these
amendments addressed specifically the "Army, Navy, Air Force
and Marine Corps"'57 or "personnel of the Department of De-
fense."' 8 This time, Congress did not leave its intent to include
the Navy within the scope of the legislation open to question.
The first three sections of the 1981 legislation merely codified
the existing practices of loaning military equipment to civilian
agencies, 59 training civilians in the operation and maintenance of
military gear,16 0 sharing information collected in the course of mili-
tary operations,' 6 ' and taking civilian needs into consideration
when planning routine military activity. 62 The new statute's sixth
section provided that any assistance offered could not degrade the
military's preparedness. 63 The seventh section dealt with the need
for an established scheme whereby the Department of Defense re-
forcement" and that they do not know a suspect's rights and therefore might jeopardize a
prosecution as a result of being placed "in a field of expertise in which they are not trained."
Id. at 14,980 (statement of Rep. Sawyer).
154. Id. at 14,980.
155. See generally Hearings on H.R. 3519, supra note 134, at 20-21, 31. The civil libertar-
ians feared establishing a precedent in which military force would be directed at activities
within the civilian community. The Department of Defense feared a drain on its resources
and a distraction from its primary purpose of maintaining combat readiness. The federal
law enforcement agencies feared losing control of their high visibility roles in the war on
drugs to a mammoth Pentagon bureaucracy certain to overshadow them all. Note, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 13, at 420-21.
156. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905(a)(1), 95
Stat. 1114 (1981) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-80 (1988)).
157. 10 U.S.C. §§ 372, 373, 375 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
158. Id. § 374.
159. Id. § 372 (1982).
160. Id. § 373 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
161. Id. § 371.
162. Id.
163. Id. § 376 (1982).
[Vol. 31:445
1990] FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT SEA
ceived reimbursement for the reasonable cost of any assistance
rendered. 64
Although the Navy held little interest in those sections, the
fourth, fifth and eighth sections of the 1981 legislation immediately
caught the Navy's attention. The fourth section appears to bar the
use of Navy resources to interdict suspected lawbreaking vessels or
aircraft outside the United States' territory, 65 and the fifth seems
to extend that prohibition to Navy searches, seizures and arrests in
general. 6  Nevertheless, the concluding language of the statute's
fifth section167 and the non-preemption clause in the eighth and
final section of the 1981 amendments effectively render moot these
apparent departures from the Posse Comitatus Act's past inappli-
cability to the Navy.'6 8 To a large degree, the eighth section's non-
preemption language merely freezes the Navy's law enforcement
authority precisely where it was before the 1981 amendments'
enactment. 69
164. Id. § 377.
165. The fourth section provides, inter alia, that in certain "emergency circumstance[s],"
equipment used for civilian law enforcement may be operated "outside the land area of the
United States" by "personnel of the Department of Defense," provided that it "is not used
to interdict or to interrupt the passage of vessels or aircraft." Id. § 374 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). In 1986 this section was amended. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987,
Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 1373(c), 100 Stat. 3824, 4007 (1986); Defense Drug Interdiction Assis-
tance Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3056, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-77 (1986). The current version is
similar to the original, but permits the interception of vessels or aircraft only for the pur-
pose of directing them to locations designated by "appropriate civilian officials." 10 U.S.C. §
374 (1988).
166. "The Secretary of Defense shall issue such regulations as may be necessary to ensure
that the provision of any assistance ... to any civilian law enforcement official under this
chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air
Force or Marine Corps in an interdiction of a vessel or aircraft, a search and seizure, arrest,
or other similar activity..... 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1988).
167. The fifth section concludes with the proviso, "unless participation in such activity by
such member is otherwise authorized by law." Id.
168. "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the executive
branch in the use of military personnel or equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes
beyond that provided by law prior to the enactment of this chapter." Id. § 378. In 1984, this
section was amended to substitute "before December 1, 1981" for "prior to the enactment of
this chapter." Id. § 378 (1988).
169. Commentators generally agree on interpretation of the 1981 amendments. See e.g.,
Rice, supra note 142, at 27 ("As the Navy and Marine Corps had neither been subject to the
original nor the new Act, restraints applicable only to the new Act do not affect them. This
position is reinforced by section 378 . . . ."); Hilton, Recent Developments Relating to the
Posse Comitatus Act, 1983 THE ARMy L. 1, 7 (1983) (The importance of § 378 "lies in its
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Since the enactment of the 1981 amendments to the Posse Com-
itatus Act, the Navy's official attitude has not changed significantly
regarding the legality of its enforcement activity at sea. The Navy
still applies the Act's limitations to itself as a matter of executive
policy,17 0 merely modifying the language of its self-imposed re-
straint to conform with the terms of the otherwise inapplicable
1981 amendments. 171 In practice, however, the Navy is far more
active in the enforcement of federal laws. Navy ships now routinely
carry Coast Guard boarding teams, and this "indirect"'172 Navy as-
preserving the option of using Navy and Marine Corps personnel in those instances in which
the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of members of the Army or Air Force" and can
be read only that way because a contrary reading would prohibit the use of Navy ships to
transport boarding teams of Coast Guardsmen.). The transportation of Coast Guard board-
ing teams by Navy vessels was a goal of the 1981 legislation. Moreover, a 1986 amendment
to the statute directed the Secretary of Transportation to implement this practice. 10 U.S.C.
§ 379 (1988).
170. See supra notes 128-29, 133 and accompanying text.
171. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW EN-
FORCEMENT OFFICIALS (Jan. 15, 1986).
172. Although the Navy characterizes its law enforcement assistance to civilian agencies
and to the Coast Guard as being merely "indirect" to avoid raising the posse comitatus
issue, this label is little more than an explanatory fig leaf attempting to hide de facto Navy
enforcement of United States law. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 567 (9th
Cir.) (court focuses on the "direct" nature of Navy assistance to Coast Guard law enforce-
ment efforts), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891
(D.D.C. 1988) (discussing the "indirect" nature of Navy law enforcement assistance
throughout the court's opinion); see also 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1988) (Posse Comitatus Act
amendment proscribing "direct participation" in law enforcement actions by Navy
personnel).
An illustration makes the point: In November 1982, the Coast Guard seized the smuggling
vessel Recife in the Caribbean with an illicit cargo of more than 50,000 pounds of marijuana.
OPERATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. COAST GUARD,
GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIGEST OF INTERDICTION STATISTICS 15 (Sept. 30, 1988) [herein-
after GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIGEST]. The Coast Guard arrested eleven crewmen. Id.
Officially, Coast Guardsmen made the seizure and arrests with the "indirect" assistance of
the Navy. Id. On this occasion, however, the Navy's "indirect" assistance took the form of
locating and investigating the suspect vessel, dispatching a Navy helicopter to photograph
her, developing and analyzing those photographs aboard a Navy aircraft carrier, twice di-
verting a Navy guided missile cruiser to intercept and hail the suspect vessel, flying the
Coast Guard boarding party to the cruiser, ferrying the boarding party from the cruiser to
the Recife in a Navy whaleboat, "covering" the Coast Guard boarding party by manning
weapons both aboard the cruiser and in the whaleboat alongside the Recife, handling all of
the communications between the Coast Guard detachment at the scene and the Coast
Guard's district headquarters in Miami, and once the Coast Guard boarding party had actu-
ally seized the Recife, providing logistics support necessary for the Coast Guardsmen to take
the Recife and her crew safely to Puerto Rico for criminal prosecution in a United States
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sistance has resulted in a significant number of narcotics seizures
and arrests. 73
In the wake of the 1981 legislation, the federal courts are wres-
tling with the amended Posse Comitatus Act's applicability to
Navy law enforcement activity at sea. In the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the original 1878 statute does not limit
the Navy's conduct at all,17 4 but a district court in the District of
Columbia was unwilling to reach the same conclusion. 75 The evi-
dent contradiction presented by the fourth, fifth and eighth sec-
tions of the 1981 amendments muddies the situation even more.
Those few courts that considered the issue chose, like the court in
Walden more than a decade before, to base their decisions on
whether the Navy activity in question violated the service's inter-
nal regulations.7 6 Consequently, the principal legal impediment to
federal court. Telephone interview with Lieutenant Commander Patrick Shuck, U.S. Coast
Guard, former Commanding Officer, Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Team (Jan. 18,
1989) (present as a key participant in the events recited). For discussions of similar inci-
dents, see Lardner, Terrorism Suspect Set Up by Friend, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1987, at
A18, col. 1; Moore, Navy Ship "Shells" Boat in Drug Raid, Virginian-Pilot, July 17, 1983, at
B1, col. 6.
173. Congress mandated that the Coast Guard place boarding teams on Navy ships and
provided funding for an additional 500 Coast Guard law enforcement officers for that pur-
pose in 1986. 10 U.S.C. § 379 (1988). During the period from May 1982 through September
1988, this practice resulted in more than 65 narcotics interdictions, 325 arrests of civilian
smuggling suspects, and seizures of more than 767,000 pounds of marijuana and 1,889
pounds of cocaine. GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIGEST, supra note 172, at 15-17.
174. Showengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987) (Navy per-
sonnel searched the office of a Navy civil servant suspected of committing sexual offenses;
court concluded that, because the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the Navy, the
plaintiff had no cause of action against that service); United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565
(9th Cir.) (Coast Guard boarding team seized marijuana smuggling vessel while operating
from a Navy warship; court stated that it would not read the Navy into the language of the
Posse Comitatus Act), cert denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).
175. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 89 (D.D.C. 1988) (court applied same analysis
of Posse Comitatus Act to the Navy's assistance in apprehension and transport of a sus-
pected terrorist as it applied to those services mentioned specifically in the Act).
176. See United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839
(1986); United States v. Del Prado-Montero, 740 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1021 (1984).
In Roberts, the Ninth Circuit determined that § 378 of the 1981 amendments must be
read literally. As a consequence, the court inquired only whether the Navy's actions in this
smuggling interdiction violated the law as it existed on December 1, 1981. Roberts, 779 F.2d
at 567-68. On that date, the relevant Navy directive, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE
NAVY, INSTRUCTION No. 5820.7, COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
(May 15, 1974), limited departure from the Posse Comitatus Act principally to those situa-
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Navy law enforcement operations on the high seas remains its de-
sire to abide by the limitations contained in the original Posse
Comitatus Act and the 1981 amendments.
THE POLICY QUESTION
The Unique Nature of the Enforcement Environment
Although good reasons exist to fear the intrusion of a standing
army into civilian police functions on land, the same concerns do
not apply when the activity's locus is on the high seas. The law
enforcement environment at sea is fundamentally different from
that ashore. At sea, the physical setting is more dangerous and de-
manding, the nature of civilian activity conducted is of limited
scope and subject to extensive governmental regulation, and the
trackless territory involved is characterized by an absence of both
law enforcement personnel and a civil population to assist them. 7'
Federal courts have acknowledged repeatedly this basic environ-
mental distinction. 17  As recently as 1983, the United States Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its recognition of the disparity between the
two settings when it pointed out that each calls for the employ-
ment of different judicial standards.17 The United States Coast
tions in which the Navy Secretary had previously consented. The consent to this kind of
boarding activity at the time of the Roberts interdiction addressed only units of the Atlantic
fleet. Roberts, 779 F.2d at 568. Because the Roberts interdiction was undertaken by a unit of
the Pacific fleet, the court found a violation of the Navy's own regulation. Id. Consequently,
the court found the action contrary to the law as it existed on December 1, 1981, and thus
outside the ambit of § 378. Id. Having lost the protection of the non-preemptive section of
the 1981 amendments, the court reviewed the Navy's action in light of the remainder of the
Act. Id. Because the Navy conduct under scrutiny involved the interdiction of a vessel, the
court determined that the Navy violated the provisions of § 374 of the 1981 amendments.
Id.
In Del Prado-Montero, the First Circuit examined essentially the same situation as the
court in Roberts, but the event in Del Prado-Montero involved a unit of the Atlantic fleet.
The court determined that the Navy's actions complied with its own directives and thus did
not violate either the Posse Comitatus Act or its 1981 amendments. Del Prado-Montero, 740
F.2d at 116.
177. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
178. E.g., United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[Tlhe national
frontiers of the oceans are much more difficult to police than the territorial boundaries of
the land.").
179. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (refusing to apply the
standard announced in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), for random automobile
stops to the similar stop of a vessel in a narrow channel 18 miles inland because "[tihe
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Guard, for example, may make searches, seizures and arrests at sea
without being impeded by the shoreside requirement of first ob--
taining a warrant.18 0 Similarly, federal law permits Coast Guard
enforcement officers to stop and board vessels at sea without any
suspicion of illegal activity, while police officers on land must have
some articulable suspicion before stopping and detaining a
citizen.181
The forgoing discussion is not meant to suggest that American
citizens and others subject to the operation of United States law
on the high seas are somehow outside the ambit of the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of civil rights and liberties. Quite the opposite is
true.'82 Instead, the Court's situs-oriented distinction relates prin-
cipally to determining which governmental intrusions and limited
deprivations of liberty are reasonable given the special circum-
stances attendant to enforcing the law at sea.' 83 Because drawing
nature of waterborne commerce .. .is sufficiently different from the nature of vehicular
traffic on highways"); see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (the framers
intended search and seizure of vessels relative to the enforcement of revenue laws to be
outside the scope of the fourth amendment and its limitations on similar government activ-
ity ashore); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925) (noting that the difference
between possession of goods ashore and afloat obviates the usual fourth amendment require-
ment to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search or seizure aboard a vessel); United
States v. Shelnut, 625 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[S]eizures and searches on the high seas
are fundamentally different from those on land."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983 (1982); United
States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1079 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing the "inapplicability of land-
based law" in its justification of the Coast Guard's virtually unlimited power to stop, board
and search vessels on the high seas).
180. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1982); see United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1976)
(discussing the Coast Guard's statutory power to perform searches and seizures on the high
seas); Carmichael, At Sea With the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51, 99-100
(1977) (providing a detailed examination of the history of searches at sea, with emphasis on
the distinction between the enforcement environments ashore and afloat).
181. United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir.) (Neither probable cause
nor reasonable suspicion is needed prior to boarding a vessel to ensure its compliance with
safety, documentation, customs and narcotics laws.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 1050 (1983);
United States v. Burke, 716 F.2d 935, 937 (1st Cir. 1983) ("automobile stops are significantly
different from ... boarding vessels on the high seas" and the unconstitutionality of random
warrantless stops of vehicles ashore "does not extend beyond dry land"); United States v.
Chaparro-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1982) (Coast Guard is authorized to stop and
board vessels on the high seas "in the complete absence of suspicion of criminal activity")
(citing United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1075 (5th Cir. 1980)).
182. See infra notes 183-84.
183. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584-93 (determining that the unique circumstances
attending marine commerce and navigation render warrantless random stops and limited
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this line is necessarily subjective, substantial disagreement contin-
ues regarding just where the mark should be placed.18 4 Neverthe-
less, a distinction exists between juridical latitude granted to en-
forcement agents ashore and to those afloat. One cannot condemn
the notion of Navy law enforcement at sea because analogous con-
duct ashore would be objectionable on public policy grounds. 18 5
Navy law enforcement at sea must stand or fall on its own merits.
The Historical Precedent
Navies around the world have historically enforced their na-
tions' laws at sea.'86 For the most part, this naval enforcement has
been a matter of necessity. Navy vessels often are the only means
by which a government can exercise its proscriptive power at sea.
Few nations can afford to maintain both a navy for purely military
purposes and a Coast Guard-like enforcement organization capable
of carrying out a maritime police function more than a few miles
from that nation's shores.18 7 Understandably, in addressing piracy
investigatory boardings by the government reasonable); see United States v. DeWeese, 632
F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980) (formulating a method for applying the fourth amendment Katz
test of reasonableness of searches, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), to the special
situation existing aboard vessels at sea), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); United States v.
Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 641 n.25 (D.P.R. 1978) (refusing to measure Coast Guard conduct
at sea "blindly ... against standards which are operative in less exigent circumstances" in
examining whether Miranda's custodial element, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
was triggered by the government's armed detention of suspected smugglers on the fantail of
their vessel).
184. In the leading Supreme Court case on the issue, for example, a dissent argued that
the majority strayed too far from the basic tenets of the Constitution and Bill of Rights in
determining what governmental conduct was "reasonable" at sea. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. at 593-610 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug
Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889-926 (1987) (discussing the expansion
of governmental power with regard to waging the war on drugs and how that power en-
croaches on the Bill of Rights); Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth
Amendment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REV. 725 (1980).
185. The relevant inquiry here is not whether civil liberties are exposed to any greater
risk of infringement at sea, but whether enforcement activity by the Navy poses more of a
threat to those liberties than comparable efforts by civilian law enforcement agencies. They
would not. See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text.
186. Telephone interview with Captain Alexander, Chief, Strategic and Operations Divi-
sion, Operations Department, United States Naval War College, United States Navy (Nov.
27, 1989).
187. Of approximately 150 nations with some kind of maritime armed force, only 35 pos-
sess both a navy and a coast guard organization. See JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS: 1989-90, supra
476
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and the slave trade, two seagoing crimes against humanity,"'8 both
the 1958 and 1982 Law of the Sea treaties specifically indicated
that arrests and seizures were to be "carried out by warships." '189
The drafters of both treaties merely restated customary interna-
tional law.190
The United States has a long history of using its Navy for high
seas law enforcement. The suppression of piracy was one of the
very first missions assigned to the nation's Navy. As a conse-
quence, the Navy once spent an enormous amount of time hunting
suspected brigands and bringing them to justice in American
courts.19" ' Although the last known trial of a pirate captured by the
Navy was in 1831,192 the Navy campaigned against piracy as late as
note 12. Few of those have a coast guard with the capability to conduct law enforcement
operations far offshore.
188. See S. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 879, 1083 (1962).
189. The texts of the 1958 and 1982 treaties are nearly identical. Both state that seizures
for piracy "may only be carried out by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or air-
craft on Government service authorized to that effect." Convention on the High Seas,
opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, art. 21, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2318, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, at 1218,
450 U.N.T.S. 82, at 92 [hereinafter 1958 Treaty]; United Nations Third Conference on the
Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. 107, The Law of the Sea: Official
Text of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea With Annexes and Index 35
(1983) [hereinafter 1982 Treaty]. Similarly, the articles governing suppression of the slave
trade explicitly contemplate enforcement by "warships." 1958 Treaty, art. 22, 13 U.S.T. at
2318, 450 U.N.T.S. at 92; 1982 Treaty, art. 110, Official Text at 35-36. The "right of ap-
proach" or "right of visit" concept also reflects the depth of the customary use of Navy
vessels for law enforcement work. Under that doctrine, mere suspicion that a vessel may be
of the same nationality as the warship involved, even if the suspect vessel is flying the flag of
another nation, is sufficient grounds for stopping her and sending aboard a party under the
command of a Navy officer to confirm or deny the suspicion. 1958 Treaty, art. 22, 13 U.S.T.
at 2318, 450 U.N.T.S. at 92; 1982 Treaty, art. 110, Official Text at 35-36. Implicit in this
grant of authority is the recognition that the warship has some enforcement power over
vessels of its nation in the first place. No other reason for risking interference with the right
of genuinely foreign vessels to navigate upon the high seas could be logically imagined. Fi-
nally, international law explicitly reserves to warships the right of "hot pursuit" of sus-
pected law breaking vessels. 1958 Treaty, art. 23, 13 U.S.T. at 2318-19, 450 U.N.T.S. at 94,
96; 1982 Treaty, art. 111, Official Text at 36-37. See S. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note
188, at 878, 881, 885, 894, 904.
190. So strong was the custom of using Navy vessels for law enforcement duty that the
1956 International Law Commission, which sought to first codify the customary law in the
1958 treaty, desired to limit the recognition of this high seas enforcement power concerning
piracy only to warships or military aircraft. B. DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA
PIRACY 122 (1980).
191. See E. ENGLE & A. LoTr, AMERICA'S MARITIME HERITAGE 153-54 (1975).
192. Id. at 154.
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1870.113 More recently, Navy ships responded to an alleged act of
piracy aboard a Portuguese cruise liner in the Caribbean in 1961.194
The United States' anti-piracy statute still authorizes the use of
Navy vessels for its enforcement. 195 In the early half of the nine-
teenth century, American warships similarly spent much of their
sea time enforcing the nation's laws suppressing the slave trade.'
Fifty years later and half a world away, the United States deployed
Navy gunboats to combat pelagic seal poaching in the Bering
Sea.197 Even though similar enforcement campaigns are virtually
unheard of today, current legislation specifically authorizes the
Navy to assist in enforcing a wide range of federal laws.'
The Coast Guard Example
Although the legitimacy of the Navy's inherent law enforcement
power may be questioned, the propriety of using the United States
Coast Guard to enforce American law on the high seas has never
been seriously doubted. 199 This dichotomy seems curious, particu-
larly given that no meaningful difference exists between the two
services in this regard. Like the Navy, the Coast Guard is a mili-
193. See generally Brownson, The Pirate Ship Forward, in AMERICA SPREADS HER SAILS
138-52 (C. Barrow, Jr. ed. 1973) (a Navy officer's account of the expedition that pursued the
pirate ship Forward).
194. Petrie, Pirates and Naval Officers, 291 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 16 (1982).
195. 33 U.S.C. §§ 381, 382 (1982).
196. See E. ENGLE & A. LOTT, supra note 191, at 157-58. The suppression of the slave
trade was so firmly ingrained in the United States Navy's institutional psyche that, on the
occasion of "salvaging" a German commerce raider during a "neutrality patrol" in 1941, the
captain of the United States Navy cruiser making the capture later thought it best to char-
acterize his boarding as an investigation of a suspected slaver to avoid the diplomatic pro-
tests likely to attend an otherwise objectionable act by a neutral power. P. ABBAZIA, MR.
ROOSEVELT'S NAVY 346-49 (1975).
197. Between 1891 and 1900, the United States employed Navy gunboats to prevent off-
shore poaching activity. The Navy shared this mission with the United States Revenue Cut-
ter Service, an ancestor of the U.S. Coast Guard. R. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 9. The
termination of the Navy's participation in this event, occurring as it did well after passage
of the Posse Comitatus Act, was not due to any question of legal propriety, but rather re-
sulted from a need to employ Navy gunboats elsewhere. See J. SWEETMAN, AMERICAN NAVAL
HISTORY 113-34 (1984).
198. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
199. Jackson v. State, 572 P.2d 87, 92-93 (Alaska 1977); Note, Don't Call Out the
Marines, supra note 13, at 1491-92. See generally R. JOHNSON, supra note 10 (Coast Guard's
primary mission was law enforcement both before and after passage of the Posse Comitatus
Act; the Act had no discernible effect on the service).
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tary service-armed, trained and ready for combat duty; 00 it has
participated in nearly all major conflicts engaged in by the United
States during the past 200 years.201 The Coast Guard's high seas
enforcement vessels are United States' "warships,"20 2 and routinely
use specialized military hardware when carrying out their law en-
forcement duties on the high seas. 0 3
The Coast Guard can claim no inherent institutional superiority
to performing civilian law enforcement work,20 4 especially with re-
gard to training. Any willing student, irrespective of the uniform
he wears, can receive law enforcement instruction.20 5 Currently,
most Coast Guard law enforcement officers receive almost no de-
tailed law enforcement training. 06 Instead, only individuals in key
200. "The Coast Guard... shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of
the United States at all times." 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The most recent reminder of the
Service's status as a member of the nation's corps of fighting forces occurred in April 1988
when the Reagan Administration planned to assign a flotilla of Coast Guard cutters to the
American "combat" operation in the Persian Gulf. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988, § I, at 1,
col. 1.
201. 1 KING, GEORGE WASHINGTON'S COAST GUARD 145 (1978). See generally R. JOHNSON,
supra note 10.
202. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1979).
203. Most seagoing Coast Guard cutters carry a deck gun or several large machine guns.
Navy accounts fund much of this weaponry, most of which is the same type used by the
Navy for engaging an enemy in battle. The weaponry has been used frequently to fire warn-
ing shots either across the bows of suspect vessels or into those vessels to make them stop.
In the period from 1980-88, for example, Coast Guard cutters directed nearly 1,000 rounds
of heavy machine gun fire into more than a dozen different vessels to force them to stop for
law enforcement boarding. GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIGEST, supra note 172, at 18. It is
hard to see how the coercive effect of a Navy vessel performing law enforcement work at sea
would be substantially more impressive than that routinely created now by most of the
Coast Guard's high seas enforcement units.
204. A point not lost on Congress: "There is no particular mystique about the Coast
Guard.... [T]o say that they are much more capable of doing these things than the military
is not true." 127 CONG. REC. 15,675 (1981) (statement of Rep. Bennett).
205. In 1988, for example, the Coast Guard provided law enforcement training to its own
personnel and students from nearly two dozen foreign nations. Telephone interview with
Petty Officer Potts, Logistics Coordinator, International Training Team, Coast Guard Mari-
time Law Enforcement School (Jan. 18, 1989). The Coast Guard should have little difficulty
providing similar training for the United States Navy.
206. Federal law mandates that every commissioned, warrant and petty officer in the
Coast Guard shall be a federal law enforcement officer. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982). Of the
nearly 39,000 military members of the Coast Guard, 28,000 people are legally empowered to
perform federal law enforcement. THE COAST GUARD, AN OvERvIEw, supra note 11, at 6;
Telephone interview with Master Chief Petty Officer Roach, Statistician, Enlisted Personnel
Branch, Office of Personnel, Coast Guard Headquarters (Jan. 18, 1989); see 14 U.S.C. §
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enforcement-related billets are targeted for the Coast Guard's
principal law enforcement training effort.207 The same approach
could be applied easily to selected Navy personnel. 08 As it is, mili-
tary police programs in the other armed forces are much more ex-
tensive, employing twice as many law enforcement specialists as
the Coast Guard has people in uniform. 0 9
As for the ability to maintain law enforcement proficiency in the
field, the nation's Coast Guard and Navy again have essentially the
same weaknesses and strengths. Like the Navy, the Coast Guard's
attention is divided between enforcement-related activities and a
variety of other primary pursuits.21 0 Many Coast Guard units en-
gage in no law enforcement. Even in those units that devote con-
siderable time to maritime police work, the actual occurrence of a
seizure or arrest is surprisingly rare.211 Most Coast Guard law en-
forcement officers complete their careers without ever making a
89(a) (1982). Nevertheless, the Coast Guard has identified only 3,200 jobs within the organi-
zation that involve a meaningful amount of law enforcement work. Telephone interview
with Lieutenant McGloughan, Senior Instructor, Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement
School (Oct. 13, 1988). Individuals assigned to those relatively few billets are the focus of
the service's law enforcement training effort. Id. The others may receive law enforcement
training, but the likelihood of this happening is remote. The Coast Guard's internal qualifi-
cation policies require officers to receive limited exposure to law enforcement training (often
nothing more than a single lecture of several hours' duration), and include no requirement
for its petty officers either to receive such training or to demonstrate any knowledge on the
topic. See DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, COAST GUARD INSTITUTE
PAMPHLET D45201, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR E-4 (Aug. 1985) [hereinafter PAMPHLET
D45201].
207. See PAMPHLET D45201, supra note 206.
208. See Note, A Proposal for Direct Use, supra note 18, at 304.
209. The Army and the Marine Corps together have approximately 26,000 military police
officers; the Air Force has 39,000 aerospace security personnel; and the Navy has 1,800 mas-
ters-at-arms as opposed to approximately 38,000 uniformed personnel of all ranks and spe-
cialties in the Coast Guard. Telephone interview with Sergeant-Major Malavet, Proponency
Branch, Military Police School, United States Army (Jan. 18, 1989); Telephone interview
with Gunnery Sergeant Bradley, Enlisted Assignment Monitor for Military Policy, Head-
quarters, United States Marine Corps (Jan. 18, 1989); Telephone interview with Command
Sergeant-Major Perkins, Chief Enlisted Manager, Office of Security Police, United States
Air Force (Jan. 18, 1989); Telephone interview with Master Chief Petty Officer Cochran,
Master at Arms Detailer, Naval Military Personnel Command, United States Navy (Jan. 18,
1989); THE COAST GUARD, AN OVERVIEW, supra note 11, at 16. These individuals in the De-
partment of Defense make many more arrests each year than do members of the Coast
Guard. 127 CONG. REC. 15,675 (1981) (statement by Rep. Bennett).
210. See supra note 11.
211. Intervals of several years between such instances are not uncommon.
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search, seizing evidence or placing a suspect under arrest. More-
over, unlike law enforcement specialists in the other armed forces,
the Coast Guard's enforcement officers are assigned enforcement
duty on a collateral basis. Each has a primary specialty other than
law enforcement that governs his assignment pattern, advanced
professional training and overall service experience.
Related to similarities in law enforcement proficiencies, the
Navy is every bit as capable of safeguarding a civilian suspect's
civil liberties as the Coast Guard. This point is especially signifi-
cant in light of Congress' concern about losing court cases due to
untrained personnel. This concern motivated Congress to omit a
grant of Navy search, seizure and arrest authority in the 1981
Posse Comitatus Act amendments.212 Surely, Navy personnel can
be trained in the subtleties of civilian law enforcement procedure.
In fact, military members may be especially well suited for the task
when the protection of an accused's civil rights are concerned. For
example, the procedural rules associated with the military justice
system are more protective of a suspect's rights generally than are
their civilian counterparts. 13 Moreover, an appreciation for and a
detailed knowledge of those rights are inculcated in members of
212. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
213. For example, whereas a civilian is entitled to a reading of his Miranda rights only in
a situation of custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a military
suspect is entitled to the same rights-oriented warnings as soon as he is suspected of wrong-
doing and is questioned about conduct relating to that suspicion. MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, app. 2, § 831, art. 31(b) (1984). Moreover, unlike the civilian rules,
military justice requires that an individual be informed of the specific misconduct of which
he is suspected at the time that he is informed of his rights. Id. Similar additional protec-
tions pervade the military justice system. For example, individuals have a right to appointed
counsel regardless of the indigence of the accused and a formal, open, inter partes proceed-
ing on the record to determine the existence of probable cause and whether the accused
should be taken to trial (as opposed to the closed, ex parte grand jury proceeding used in
the civilian criminal justice system). Id. § 828, art. 32. Trial lawyer F. Lee Bailey, who has
defended clients in both the military and civilian justice systems, has written that "[ilt is
ironic that many people criticize the military system of justice as inferior and unfair....
The fact is, if I were innocent, I would far prefer to stand trial before a military tribunal
governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice than by any court, state or federal." F.
BAILEY, FOR THE DEFENSE 38 (1976). But see Note, Navy's Role, supra note 13, at 1959
(saying that "law enforcement concepts such as 'probable cause,' 'reasonable suspicion,' and
'due process' are alien to [military] personnel"); Note, Don't Call Out the Marines, supra
note 13, at 1493 (The use of the military in civilian law enforcement would be a "de facto
implementation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in society and [would] move the
country toward a subtle but insidious species of martial law" because military personnel
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the military at every level. By the time an officer rises to command
a field unit, he has become exceptionally well versed in the protec-
tions that the American system of justice extends to one accused of
violating the law.214 Coast Guardsmen themselves are military
members subject to and indoctrinated in the Uniform Code of Mil-
itary Justice.215 Their ability to enforce the law competently at sea
rebuts any supposed incompatibility between military enforcement
of civilian law and the protection of those suspects' constitutional
rights.
Congress has considered transferring the Coast Guard's func-
tions to the Navy. Indeed, Congress considered initiatives that
would require the Navy to take over the Coast Guard's law en-
forcement function on at least two occasions before the passage of
the Posse Comitatus Act,2"' and on five occasions since.21 Many of
the initiatives nearly passed.218 None failed due to any concern
about its legality.219 Instead, the most frequent reason given for an
initiative's failure was one of efficiency: a desire to keep the Navy
unfettered by the distraction of law enforcement duties.22 o
"become an embodiment of military behavior, military values, and, most critically, military
justice.").
214. During the 1981 debates on the Posse Comitatus Act amendments, one of the debate
participants, Senator McCollum of Florida, said:
I have spent 4 years on active duty in the U.S. Navy's Judge Advocate General
Corps. I have been a reservist ever since that time wearing that particular ban-
ner. And I can tell the Members that the military law under the UCMJ is far
more stringent in this area of its requirements than the civilian criminal law
area. The military personnel, particularly the officers in command of the ves-
sels and the craft and the units involved, have very strong backgrounds and
stringent backgrounds in obeying the constitutional principles involved in en-
forcing laws of this [narcotics smuggling] nature. So I do not think that prob-
lem merits the kind of attention that it has gotten today. Although it should be
discussed, it does not hold water.
127 CONG. REc. 15,685 (1981) (statement of Sen. McCollum).
215. 10 U.S.C.F. § 261, 803 (1988).
216. These initiatives occurred in 1843 and 1859. H.R. Doc. No. 670, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess.
299-349 (1912); S. EVANS, THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 1790-1915 35 (1949).
217. The post Posse Comitatus Act initiatives occurred in 1889, 1912, 1919 and 1933. R
JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 3, 19-22, 57-62, 128-32.
218. Id.
219. The 1912 initiative, for example, failed primarily because of President Taft's poor
relationship with Congress and the occurrence of the Titanic disaster that year. Id. at 21-22.
220. Id. at 19-21.
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The Situation Today and Tomorrow
The Navy is effectively engaged in high seas law enforcement
operations today. Although most of this activity is directed at com-
batting maritime narcotics smuggling, 21 the Navy has enforced
federal immigration laws in the recent past.2 22 Congress has en-
dorsed this conduct on several occasions with the passage of sup-
porting legislation.2 As a consequence, using Navy vessels to de-
tect, track and intercept suspects at sea has become a major part
of the nation's maritime law enforcement effort. 24 Moreover, the
degree of the Navy's involvement in these operations and the na-
ture of the "assistance" it has rendered the Coast Guard and other
agencies make it hard to distinguish between the Navy's work and
the Coast Guard's authorized law enforcement activities.225 Pro-
221. See generally Woodall, LEO: Caribbean Jungle Law, 1014 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC.
109-10 (1987).
222. During 1980, for example, Navy ships carried Coast Guard boarding teams and en-
gaged in law enforcement patrols in the international waters between Cuba and the south-
ern coast of Florida. Hearings on H.R. 3519, supra note 134, at 54 (statement of Rear Ad-
miral Thompson, Chief, Office of Operations, U.S. Coast Guard).
223. In addition to the 1981 Posse Comitatus Act amendments authorizing the use of
Navy vessels as platforms from which the Coast Guard could perform its enforcement func-
tion, 10 U.S.C. § 374 (1982), Congress authorized funding for some 500 Coast Guard law
enforcement officers for specific assignment to patrol duty aboard Navy vessels. 10 U.S.C. §
379 (1988).
224. From April 1981 to October 1988, Navy assistance made possible 106 Coast Guard
narcotics interdictions. This assistance led to some 531 arrests and the seizure of more than
1.8 million pounds of marijuana, more than a ton of cocaine and 94 smuggling vessels. GEN-
ERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIGEST, supra note 172, at 15-17.
225. See supra note 172. The procedures the Navy follows in performing work in the field
guarantee that its role will be more than passive. Indeed, despite the presence of Coast
Guard personnel aboard the Navy ships, Navy servicemen do much of the detecting and
tracking of suspects, Navy ships transport the boarding team to its destination, carry the
Coast Guardsmen to the vessel to be boarded in a Navy launch, provide vital communica-
tions services and "back-up" security during the boarding, and-if a seizure or arrest is
made-Navy ships transport, guard and care for the prisoners, and tow or escort the seized
vessel and evidence to a United States port for later prosecution. See generally UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD, ATLANTIC AREA INSTRUCTION M16240.1, LEDET MANUAL (1988) (pro-
viding procedures for and responsibilities of Coast Guard and Navy personnel during law
enforcement activity). Not only has this "assistance" gone as far as firing warning or disa-
bling shots, Moore, supra note 172, but, on one occasion, the latter activity resulted in the
wounding of a civilian smuggling suspect aboard the vessel being interdicted. GENERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT DIGEST, supra note 172, at 18. One way that the Navy's activity falls short of
direct enforcement of United States law is that Coast Guardsmen alone board the vessel in
question and make any arrests or seizures attendant to that boarding. Additionally, the
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
vided certain procedural safeguards are employed,226 no compelling
reason precludes the Navy from moving from "assistance" to en-
gaging directly in the enforcement of United States law on the
high seas.
Utilizing the Navy to augment the Coast Guard in high seas law
enforcement will become an economic and practical imperative in
the foreseeable future. Both the domestic and international scena-
rios awaiting the United States will demand that the Navy take a
more active role in enforcing American law at sea.227 Unfortu-
nately, this impending requirement for vastly increased American
maritime law enforcement will arrive at a time when fiscal auster-
ity is the governmental rule.228 The nation's massive federal debt
will have to be dealt with. Regardless of when and how this is
done, the government will necessarily have to make hard choices
regarding the limited amount of money available for its law en-
forcement activities and programs. The United States' small Coast
Guard is already grossly overworked and perennially underfunded,
and the future portends more of the same.229 Consequently, the na-
Navy ship is officially placed under the "tactical control" of the region's appropriate Coast
Guard operational commander ashore. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, ATLANTIC AREA IN-
STRUCTION M16240.1, LEDET MANUAL 1 (1988).
226. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
228. The United States' federal debt is rising at a rate of $7,610 per second. This figure is
based on an increase of $240 billion in the federal government's interest-bearing debt be-
tween May 1988 and May 1989. Standard and Poor's Statistical Service, Current Statistics,
Oct. 1989, at 6. The nation now spends $35 billion each year just to pay the interest on
foreign capital investment. UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC TRANSITION 304 (1988). Unless the United States
can get its economic house in order, a domestic and international economic crisis is inevita-
ble. Id.; Calleo, Cleveland, & Silk, The Dollar and Defense of the West, 66 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
846-62 (1988); Kane, Into the Storm, USA TODAY, May 1988, at 16-19; Kissinger & Vance,
An Agenda for 1989, NEWSWEEK, June 6, 1988, at 33.
229. Since World War II, the Coast Guard's size has remained fixed at approximately
37,000 personnel despite substantial growth in domestic and international activity at sea
and a population increase in the United States of more than 100 million. Even during the
halcyon defense spending days of the Reagan Administration, the Coast Guard's annual
budgets declined nearly $500 million from 1982 to 1988. Budget in Brief, COMMANDANT'S
BULLETIN, 7 U.S. Coast Guard (Feb. 25, 1988). The prospect for more favorable fiscal treat-
ment is extremely remote. Shrinking, COMMANDANT'S BULLETIN, 1 U.S. Coast Guard (Jan.
22, 1988). Recently, because of an inability to carry out some missions, the Coast Guard was
forced to close 30 units in an effort to redirect its human and material resources to only the
most critical institutional tasks. Id. Even then, a budgetary shortfall necessitated releasing
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tion cannot afford to deny itself the expanded use of its Navy in
the lean but demanding days ahead. More ships, planes and people
must be found to deal with the high seas enforcement challenge of
tomorrow. The Navy possesses each in abundance.30
RECOMMENDATIONS
The legal status of the Navy's authority for high seas law en-
forcement is unnecessarily ambiguous. On the one hand, no consti-
tutional, statutory, or public policy concern bars assigning the
Navy direct law enforcement duties at sea. On the other hand, a
history of Navy institutional reluctance to become involved in law
enforcement has created an aura of presumed impropriety sur-
rounding the undertaking. The prevailing judicial interpretation of
the 1981 Posse Comitatus Act amendments has given this pre-
sumed impropriety quasi-legal status. However, no Supreme Court
ruling is on point, and the circuits are not unanimous on the issue.
As a consequence, the Navy's exclusion from the restrictions con-
tained in the 1981 legislation appears to be limited only by the
terms of executive fiat. The matter needs clarification.
The Secretary of the Navy's authorization of naval units to en-
gage in direct law enforcement activity on the high seas is one way
to rectify the confused legal situation. The Navy could then wait
for the inevitable legal challenge to confirm or deny the propriety
of the executive action. This approach has the advantage of being
easy to implement; initially, it involves action by the executive
branch alone. Moreover, the approach comports with the legal
analysis of courts addressing the issue in several leading cases.23'
Instead of worrying about such tangential questions as whether the
more than 1,000 people from the service and temporarily cutting law enforcement patrol
time by 50-70%. Id.
230. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The Navy may also call upon its own air
force, presently comprising more than 5,000 fixed and rotary wing aircraft of all types.
JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1989-90, supra note 12, at 691. The Coast Guard, by contrast, has
only 236 aircraft. THE COAST GUARD, AN OVERVIEW, supra note 206, at 14.
231. United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 567-68 (9th Cir.) (determining factor in the
legality of Navy law enforcement is whether the action violates executive orders), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986); United States v. Del Prado-Montero, 740 F.2d 113, 116 (1st. Cir.)
(principal bars to Navy law enforcement are executive acts and regulations), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1021 (1984); United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 373-76 (4th Cir. 1974) (legality
of Marine Corps law enforcement action turns on what was permitted by executive orders).
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Secretary's authorization to his field units restricts Pacific fleet
warships from providing "indirect" assistance to the Coast
Guard,3 2 the relevant inquiry under the proposed approach would
be whether the Secretary can authorize all naval units anywhere
on the high seas to engage in direct enforcement of United States
federal law on civilian suspects.
Implementing the course of action outlined above has a number
of disadvantages. One principal shortcoming is that the federal ju-
dicial system's nature is such that the action's legal status would
likely remain uncertain even after any initial challenges. Federal
district and appellate courts would probably vary in their legal
analyses of the issue, particularly given the absence of any statu-
tory guidance. Nationwide uniformity on the matter would not be
assured. Moreover, considerable time would probably elapse before
the issue reached the Supreme Court; only then would the Navy
have a definitive review of the issue. The Supreme Court may not
even agree to hear a case implicating the issue.
The characteristics of the American judiciary aside, another and
even more compelling reason exists to avoid forcing the issue by
unilateral executive action: Such an action almost certainly would
be counterproductive. The leading concern regarding the use of
military force for civilian law enforcement is the potential for mili-
tary usurpation of power. A military department head's unilateral
grant of authority to intrude in civilian life would necessarily cre-
ate that image. Unilateral action is, therefore, likely to backfire.
Congressional amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act specifi-
cally exempting law enforcement by naval units on the high seas
would be a preferable way to clarify the situation. Such amend-
ments would put any legal questions surrounding Navy law en-
forcement to a well-deserved rest. The amendments need not be
complicated, but should be unambiguous. For policy reasons, one
amendment should include a clause mandating that any Navy en-
forcement activity must be carried out under the direction of com-
petent civilian authority. Similarly, another clause should require
that only service members appropriately designated under a
scheme promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy shall be author-
ized to conduct searches, seizures and arrests pursuant to the en-
232. See, e.g., Roberts, 779 F.2d at 565.
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forcement of civilian law. Such a requirement would overcome con-
cerns regarding law enforcement by poorly trained Navy personnel.
The language of this new legislation might take the following
form:
10 U.S.C. section 381:
(a) The forgoing provisions of this or any other chapter of
United States law notwithstanding, designated personnel of the
Navy and the Marine Corps are authorized to enforce United
States civilian law on, under or over the high seas.
(b) No law enforcement activity may be undertaken in accor-
dance with subsection (a) unless that activity is carried out under
the operational control of competent civilian authority.
(c) Definitions: For purposes of this section-
(1) "designated personnel" shall refer to those commissioned
and noncommissioned officers of the Navy and Marine Corps iden-
tified in writing by the Secretary of the Navy as possessing the
training, temperament, experience and judgment necessary to en-
force United States law on civilian suspects in a competent and
professional manner. These individuals may be identified either by
name, by relevant class (e.g., commanding officers, masters-at-
arms, etc.) or by a combination of both.
(2) "enforce" shall encompass the full range of actions relevant
to the investigation and apprehension of individuals who violate
United States law, including, but not limited to, interdiction of
suspect vessels and aircraft, searches, seizures, detentions and
arrests.
(3) "competent civilian authority" shall refer to Coast Guard
or nonmilitary federal law enforcement officials designated in writ-
ing by the Attorney General as being authorized to direct specific
instances of civilian law enforcement activity carried out by Navy
and Marine Corps personnel on, under or over the high seas. These
officials may be identified either by name, by relevant class (e.g.,
commanders of Coast Guard districts, Assistant United States At-
torneys, etc.) or by a combination of both.
Regardless of the approach taken in resolving the Navy's law en-
forcement status, several procedural safeguards should be imple-
mented. First, written policy guidelines should specify that enforc-
ing the law on the high seas is not the Navy's primary mission.
Maintaining a state of true combat readiness is and should remain
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the Navy's principal focus. Accordingly, Navy law enforcement op-
erations should be undertaken only on an "as needed" and a "not
to interfere" basis.33 Primary responsibility for federal law en-
forcement on the high seas should remain vested in the United
States Coast Guard. Second, the Navy's key command and control
personnel and all of its "hands-on" enforcement people should re-
ceive detailed training before they are permitted to engage in any
law enforcement duties. 34 Third, a comprehensive scheme of judi-
cial and administrative remedies should be implemented to punish
any abuse of suspects' rights and to deter such transgressions from
taking place.2 35 Fourth and finally, a strict rule should be estab-
lished to the effect that no Navy law enforcement shall be under-
taken unless conducted under the supervision of an appropriate
Coast Guard or civilian law enforcement official. The official need
not be present at the scene of the enforcement activity, but should
be apprised of the situation as it develops, monitor its progress,
and intervene whenever appropriate. All of this supervision can be
accomplished through a reliable "real time" communications
233. See 10 U.S.C. § 376 (1988) (stipulating that law enforcement activity, if carried out
by elements of the Department of Defense, must not detract from the military readiness
mission of those units).
234. The Navy already provides extensive legal training to its senior supervisory person-
nel and a more practically oriented curriculum to its shipboard "policemen," sailors as-
signed to the master-at-arms rating. Telephone interview with Lieutenant Evans, Instructor,
Procedure Division, Naval Justice School, United States Navy (Nov. 27, 1989); Telephone
interview with Master Chief Petty Officer Allen, Master-at-Arms Detailer, Navy Military
Personnel Command, United States Navy (Nov. 27, 1989). The Navy could easily expand
this existing scheme, which provides instruction in military justice procedures and princi-
ples, to include those differences involving law enforcement on civilian suspects. Both the
Navy and the Coast Guard currently operate resident and mobile training programs ad-
dressing these topics. Telephone interview with Lieutenant Evans, supra. Therefore, provid-
ing added training to key decisionmaking and operational personnel merely represents an
incremental change to an existing scheme.
235. At the service level, a number of administrative mechanisms hold in check potential
abuse of civilians' rights. For relatively minor breaches, sanctions involving promotion, reas-
signment, education and reenlistment opportunities for the personnel involved should prove
adequate. The Navy can achieve most of those outcomes through the existing system of
regular officer and enlisted personnel performance evaluations. More serious transgressions
can and should be dealt with through either military nonjudicial punishment proceedings or
courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Trial in a federal civilian court
is also possible. Finally, a liberal application of the federal exclusionary rule to any evidence
illegally obtained should have the same deterrent effect in a military setting that it has in
civilian law enforcement operations.
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link.2"6 If such a link cannot be established in a given case, then
the law enforcement action contemplated should be forsaken until
one can be made.
CONCLUSION
Although the need for the United States Navy's participation in
American law enforcement activity at sea will be increasingly nec-
essary, the Navy's legal authority to enforce civilian law is far from
clear today. This ambiguity must be resolved. At present, no con-
stitutional, statutory or public policy limitation prevents the Navy
from engaging in law enforcement operations at sea. Indeed, those
few legal obstacles potentially capable of frustrating such a course
of action are almost all of the Navy's own making. All are, there-
fore, susceptible to removal by the Navy.
The Navy ultimately exists to serve and protect the interests of
the American people. Discharging that duty requires that nothing
unreasonably hinder the Navy in its ability to enforce United
States law at sea. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 never has rep-
resented and should not now represent that kind of constraint on
the Navy's authority to enforce civilian laws at sea. However vital
the statute's proscriptive effect may be on land, it simply does not
translate to the unique law enforcement environment that exists
on the high seas. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 is and will re-
main an otherwise serviceable statute that is unfit for duty with
the United States Navy at sea.
Christopher A. Abel
Lieutenant, U.S. Coast Guard
236. Technology has long since brought us to the point at which close supervision and
control of activity anywhere in the world is possible. During the April 1988 naval battles in
the Persian Gulf, for example, the President of the United States personally authorized
American military pilots to engage Iranian speed boats threatening U.S. citizens in the area.
See O'Rourke, Gulf Ops., 1035 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 47 (1989). Similarly, when American
aircraft shot down two Libyan fighters over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981, the White House was
informed of the incident and was already preparing a diplomatic response before the Libyan
Government even knew what had taken place off its own coast-and that was using commu-
nications technology now nearly a decade old. Rechtin, The Technology of Command, NA-
VAL WAR C. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 5, 7. Given this capability, law enforcement operations
by the Navy can be effectively subjected to supervision by knowledgeable civilian enforce-
ment authorities ashore.
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